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Abstract
Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) is a classical problem in theoretical secu-
rity. In a SMC problem, two or more parties must compute correctly a function f
on their respective inputs x and y, while preserving the privacy of their inputs and
additional security properties.
One of the approaches proposed for addressing the SMC problem relies on the design
of Garbled Circuit (GC). In Garbled Circuits (GCs), the function to be computed
is represented as a Boolean circuit composed of binary gates. The input and output
wire of each gate is masked such that the party evaluating the Garbled Boolean
Circuits (GBC) cannot gain any information about the inputs or the intermediate
results that appear during the function evaluation. The complexity of today's most
ecient GC protocol depends linearly on the size of the Boolean circuit represen-
tation of the evaluated function. The total cost and run-time interaction between
parties increase linearly with the number of gates and can be huge for complex
GBCs. Actually, interest has grown in the eciency of this technique and in its
applications to computation outsourcing in untrusted environments.
A recent work shows that XOR gates in a Boolean circuit have no cost for the se-
cure computation protocol. Therefore, circuits with a reduced number of non-XOR
gates are more convenient and one of the possible ways to reduce the complexity
of the computation is to reduce the number of non-XOR gates in the Boolean circuit.
Recalling that, the main aim of this work is to reduce the number of non-XOR
gates, which directly results in a reduced number of interactions between the parties
and transfer complexity at runtime, we present dierent approaches for reducing the
communication cost of Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) and improving the
overall computation time and eciency of the execution of SMC.
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Preface
The thesis deals with a secure multi-party computation. The problem set-up is in-
teresting in the aspect of combining multiple fundamental issues including secure
distributed computing, garbling circuits, and cost-optimization. Since the garbled
circuit are useful in information security, we try to optimize garbled circuit transfor-
mation and construct it which requires minimum runtime interaction between the
input owners.
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Introduction
In a Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) problem, two or more parties must
compute correctly a function f on their respective inputs x and y, while preserv-
ing the privacy of their inputs. Besides inputs privacy, other security properties
are requested for the execution of the SMC protocol, such as correctness, meaning
that the output received is exactly f(x,y), and independence of inputs, meaning that
neither party can choose its input as a function of the other party's. In [2], dier-
ent paradigms for solving secure computation problems have been proposed, some
relying on Homomorphic Encryption (HE), others on Linear Secret Sharing (LSS),
usually deployed when more than two parties are involved.
In the mid 1980's, Yao proposed a rst approach for addressing two-party SMC
[79]. Yao's construction is based on the design of a Garbled Circuit (GC), that is
a normal Boolean circuit representing the function to be computed securely, but
whose evaluation is performed gate by gate using a protocol to respect inputs pri-
vacy. Indeed the input and output wires of each gate are masked so that the party
evaluating the GC cannot gain any information about the inputs or the intermedi-
ate results that appear during the function evaluation. For each gate, an Oblivious
Transfer (OT) protocol [56] is run between the two parties so that the resulting
output value can be computed without knowing the input value of the other party.
Specically, all the inputs are encrypted and during the evaluation of the output
of each gate the decryption keys are exchanged. The total OT payload increases
linearly with the number of gates, and can be huge for complex GCs. A possi-
ble approach to increase the eciency of the GC technique has been proposed by
Kolesnikov et al. [37] in 2008, enabling the evaluation of XOR gates essentially free
communication-wise (i.e., it requires one local XOR operation, and no garbled table
entries to generate or transfer). For this reason, construction of GCs requiring less
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non-XOR gates, achieves the goal of reducing OT payload and therefore reduces the
overall communication cost. The problem then is to design the GC that represents
the function f to be computed and requires the minimum interaction at runtime
between the collaborating parties. In turn, since there are multiple representations
of the same function, or better equivalent Boolean circuits, this means that we try
to select the one that has the minimum number of non-XOR gates, since XOR gates
have no cost for the execution of the secure computation protocol.
The goal of this thesis is to study the possibility of decreasing the computational
and communicational cost of the SMC by reducing the number of non-XOR gates.
This directly results in a decreased runtime interactions between the input owners,
thus improving the overall computation time and eciency of the execution of the
SMC.
Applications for two-party secure computation have three properties: (1) the appli-
cation involves inputs from two independent parties; (2) each party wants to keep its
own data secret; and (3) the participants agree to reveal the output of the compu-
tation. That is, the result itself does not imply too much information about either
party's private input.
Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC). Secure Multi-party Computation
(SMC) protocols have been introduced to give two or more parties the capability to
compute a function f of their respective inputs x and y, still keeping their inputs
private, and sharing only the nal result z = f(x, y). In the last years, SMC was
used as enabling technology for a large number of security- and privacy-critical ap-
plications (e.g., electronic auctions [48], data mining [40], remote diagnostics [14],
medical diagnostics [5], or face recognition [23]).
Yao's Garbled Circuits (GCs) Protocol.Using Garbled Circuits (GCs) pro-
tocol [79], is the rst approach to solve the SMC problem. Yao's GC construction
introduces a protocol for the evaluation of the input function (f ) represented as a
Boolean Circuit composed of binary gates. The basic idea is that one party \en-
crypts" the circuit (using symmetric keys), the other party obliviously obtains the
15
keys corresponding to both parties' inputs and the GC, and is able to decrypt the
corresponding output. One party constructs the circuit C, and converts it into a
garbled circuit and the garbled circuit is transferred to the other party. Speci-
cally, the output of each gate in the GC is evaluated by exchanging some encrypted
information between the two parties, so that none of the two parties learns any
information about the inputs of the other party. So, the important note is that just
a nal output is shared between two parties and each party do not have any infor-
mation about other party's value or any intermediate values during the protocol.
For each gate, an Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocol [56] is run between the two par-
ties so that the resulting output value can be computed without knowing the input
value of the other party. The total OT payload increases linearly with the number
of gates, and can be increased for complex GCs. Eciency of GC protocol depends
linearly on the size of the Boolean circuit representation of the evaluated function.
Free XOR Protocol. Kolesnikov and Schneider [37] proposed an improvement
that allows XOR gates to incur zero communication with no cryptographic opera-
tions. This cryptographic protocols bring signicant benet to many SMC settings
and allow to evaluate XOR gates at a substantially lower cost (i.e., in computation
and communication required for creation, transfer and evaluation of the Garbled ta-
bles) than non-XOR gates such as AND gates. The free-XOR technique [37] allows
all XOR gates to be executed by just XOR-ing the input wire labels, without the
need of any encryption operations. Because of this, it is worth investing the eort
to minimize the number of non-XOR gates in the construction of Garbled Circuits
with the goal of reducing the communication cost. The main observation of this
protocol is that it is not necessary to select all garblings independently.
Quantum Gates. One of today's most fascinating elds of research and inno-
vation involves applying quantum phenomena to new technology. The belief is that
these technologies promise to revolutionise society this century through secure com-
munication, precision measurement, and powerful computation. Whereas in classical
circuits the bit is the standard building block for storing information, in quantum
circuits the information is represented by the quantum state of qu-bits. The logical
properties of qubits also dier signicantly from those of classical bits. Bits and
16
their manipulation can be described using two constants (0 and 1) and the tools of
boolean algebra. Qubits, on the other hand, must be discussed in terms of vectors,
matrices, and other linear algebraic constructions. In particular, while a bit can
have two states only, 0> or 1>, a qu-bit stores any linear combination c 0> + d
1> of 0> and 1>, where c and d are complex numbers. A quantum logic gate has
the same number of inputs and outputs, and there is a bijective function between
each input and output. Therefore, quantum gates are inherently reversible, meaning
that any gate has a corresponding inverse operation. A quantum library contains a
set of gates that compose a universal set meaning that it is possible to realize any
reversible function using the gates in that library. NOT gate and two-bit Controlled-
NOT (or C-NOT) gate [27] and three-bit Controlled-Controlled-NOT (or CC-NOT
or Tooli) gate [73] are some of the most common gates from NCT quantum library.
Over the last couple of decades, quantum cryptography and quantum gates have
received growing attention. A large number of works in literature deals with quan-
tum key distribution, i.e., the process of using quantum communication to establish
a shared key between two parties (§2.2) [9].
Binary decision diagrams(BDDs).The standard representation form for logic
was the sum of product (SOP) form, i.e., a disjunction (OR) of conjuctions (AND)
made of literals. The advent of very large scale integration, the standard represen-
tation for logic moved from SOP to directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) [13]. A notable
example of DAG where all the nodes realize the same function is binary decision
diagrams (BDDs) [15]. BDDs are canonical and provide very ecient manipulation
procedures. For this reason, BDDs found application in various areas, such as veri-
cation, testing, optimization, automated reasoning, etc.[44].
Multiple-Valued Logic (MVL). In the eld of circuit design, Multiple Valued
Logic (MVL) [10, 46] is a direct generalization of the standard Boolean logic, where
the classical Boolean domain B = f0,1g is replaced by P = f0,1,...,jP j-1g with
jP j>1. For high level design it is natural to think of multiple valued variables,
rather than Boolean ones, with the aim of reducing the number of interconnections
required and circuit cost to implement logic functions [75].
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Problem Statement and Contributions
In this thesis we focus on improve eciency of Garble Circuit(GC) protocol in Secure
Multi-party Computation (SMC) with presenting methods for optimization of this
protocol based on reducing number of non-XOR gates, which result in reducing OT
payload and therefore reduce the overall communication cost. The overall research
question we are interested in can be stated as follows: \Given a Boolean function f
represented by a garbled Boolean circuit (GBC) and evaluated on the private inputs
held by two parties, how can we optimize this GBC transformation and how can
we construct the GBC that requires minimum runtime interaction between the input
owners?"
In brief, our contributions are as follows:
 We have put forward the methods for building ecient Boolean-Circuit for SMC
of functions based on Garbled Circuit (GC) protocols and decreasing the com-
putational cost and improving the overall eciency of the execution of the
SMC.
 Using Free-XOR technique that allows XOR gates to be evaluated "for free" in
GC construction, i.e., without relying on corresponding garbled gate. It can
help us to reduce the number of non-XOR gates that result in reduced number
of runtime interactions between the parties and the communication cost.
 Work on dierent design techniques (i.e., Quantum gates) and dierent function
representation methods (i.e., BDDs, Multiple-Valued logic). Using Quantum
gates can reduce the gate complexity and helps us to design quantum garbled
circuit (Q-GC) equivalent to the original Boolean circuit, which can result
in increasing the number of XOR gates, and decreasing the number of non-
XOR gates, thus requiring less interaction. Moreover, using Binary Decision
Diagrams (BDDs) method to identify non-XOR gates that could be replaced by
XORs without altering the output of the circuit. This method can also result
in reducing the number of operations, reducing the communication costs and
circuit cost. In addition, we follow the idea of garbled circuit protocol from
Boolean logic to the Multiple Valued Logic (MVL) setting to obtain more
compact circuit descriptions.
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In particular we have studied our methods (Quantum Garbled Circuit, BDDs, MV)
for standard functionalities such as the Millionaires' Problem, which is the problem
of determining which party has the greatest input, and for the adder, that is the
computation of the sum of the private inputs. In all cases we try to show the im-
provements achieved in terms of reduced communication time.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows:
Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) (§1).
Starts with a detailed introduction of two-party secure multi-party computation
(SMC) with special focus on Garbled circuit (GC) protocol as a solution to solve
the problem of SMC and free-XOR technique for improving eciency of GC. Be-
sides introducing compiling tools for implementing two-party secure computation
and making it as a practical applications.
Introduction to Quantum Gates (§2).
Gives more detailed introduction to quantum logic concepts and simulation tool for
synthesis, implementing and testing of quantum circuits.
Boolean Function Representation (§3).
Reviews concepts of Boolean Function Representation as Binary Decision Diagrams
(BDDs) and gives basic information on Multiple-Valued Logic (MVL) respectively.
Secure Multi-Party Computation Exploiting Quantum Gates (§4).
Presents Garbling of Boolean function and quantum implementation of Garbled
Boolean function. We show how to improve eciency of SMC by using quantum
gates instead of traditional gates in Garbled Boolean circuit construction. It also
presents one of our proposed methods (Q-GBC) for improving eciency of Garbled
Boolean Circuits.
BDDs for Secure Multi-Party Computation (§5).
Provides our proposed optimization technique in GC protocol using BDDs.
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MV for Secure Multi-Party Computation (§6).
proposes multiple valued GC protocol and the extension of the optimization tech-
nique for the evaluation of multiple valued gates.
Conclusions (§7).
Summarizes the contributions of our thesis and states nal conclusions with direc-
tions for future work in all of our proposed techniques, Q-GBC, using BDDs and
Multi-valued Logics for improving eciency of SMC.
List of Related Publications:
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COMPSAC Conference, Building Digital Autonomy for a Sustainable World, Po-
litecnico di Torino, 4 July - 8 July 2017, Turin, Italy.
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Cimato, Valentina Ciriani, Ernesto Damiani, Euromicro Conference on Digital Sys-
tem Design, (DSD), 30 August - 1 September 2017, Vienna, Austria.
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Cimato, Valentina Ciriani, Ernesto Damiani, Maryam Ehsanpour, 25th IFIP/IEEE
International Conference on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI-SoC), 23 October-
25 October 2017, Yas Viceroy, Yas Island, Abu Dhabi.
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Chapter 1
Secure Multi-party Computation
(SMC)
This chapter introduces Secure Multi-party Computation and Two-Party Secure
Computation. The most ecient solution to solve the problem of SMC (Garbled
Circuits Protocol) in the two-and multi-party setting is explained in §1.2, and op-
timization of GCs protocol has been introduced in §1.3. Finally, compiling tools
for implementation of Two-Party SMC protocols are introduced in §1.4, and related
work are described in §1.5.
1.1 Notations and Denitions
Due to the tremendous growth of the huge amount of computers and distributed
working environments, protocols are required for protecting the privacy of users and
reliability of results. This problem is known as secure multi-party computation,
which is a special case of a long-studied problem in cryptography.
in Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) the parties P1, P2, . . . , Pk with inputs
of x1, x2,. . . , xk want to compute some common function f (x1, x2,. . . , xk ) such that
a party Pi can know only its own input xi and the value of the function f. The aim
of SMC protocol is to enable parties to compute a function f in a secure manner
where keeping their inputs private, and sharing only the nal result.
SMC problem provides a general solution to execute any computation in combi-
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national circuits [78, 79]. It can have high communication cost as the complexity of
the computation grows.
The design of ecient SMC protocols is considered for a variety of security-critical
applications with sophisticated privacy and security requirements such as electronic
voting, electronic auctions [48], electronic cash schemes, data mining [40], remote
diagnostics [14], classication of medical data [5], or face recognition [23, 50, 60]. In
addition the technology of secure multi-party computation has gain much interest
recently in research community, governments and industry as a potential tool for
their need.
1.1.1 Protocol Parties
Secure computation protocols have been introduced to provide two or more interact-
ing parties with the capability of computing a function f of their respective inputs x
and y, while keeping their inputs private. The protocol involves two players or par-
ticipants, Alice and Bob, who want to evaluate and compute the function f together
on that private data while keeping their inputs secret.
1.1.2 Security in Multi-party Computation
Security of input data is of prime importance for multi-party computation. protocol
execution can be come under "attack" by an adversaries. The aim of this attack
may be to learn private information or cause incorrect result of the computation.
In order to prove that a protocol is secure and can endure any adversarial attack, a
number of dierent denitions have been considered that ensure important security
properties. The must central of these properties for multi-party computation are
dened below:
 Privacy: Nothing should be learned more than what is necessary. Parties should
learn their output and nothing else. What can be derived from the output
itself, is the only information that should be learned about other parties' input.
For example, the privacy requirement for an election protocol ensures that
no parties should learn anything about the individual votes of other parties.
Likewise, the privacy requirement for an auction protocol ensures that only
22
the winning suggestion is revealed and clearly possible to nd that all other
suggestions were lower than the winner's oer.
 Correctness: Parties are ensured that they can receive the correct output and
trusted party can not be corrupted. For example, the correctness requirement
for an auction protocol ensures that the party with the highest suggestion in
guaranteed to win.
 Guaranteed Output Delivery: Adversary should not be able to prevent honest
parties from receiving their output.
 Fairness: Adversaries or (corrupted parties) should receive their outputs if and
only if the honest parties also can receive their outputs.
Security for Multi-party Computation (MPC) can be dened an "ideal-real-world"
consisting of both "ideal world" model and "real world" model. In the "ideal world"
model, players give their inputs to a incorruptible trusted party that computes the
function on its own and sends back the result to each party. Notice that in this
ideal computation, all of the above security properties hold. In contrast, in the "real
world" model there is no trusted party, and the parties can only exchange messages
between all the parties. So, security in MPC protocol means that adversaries can
perform in the "real world" protocol and also do in the "ideal" setting.
1.1.3 Secure Two-party Computation
Secure Two-party Computation allows two parties to compute correctly a function f
on their respective inputs x and y, while preserving the privacy of their inputs and
additional security properties and sharing only the nal results. The most important
of these properties are privacy meaning that the parties learn the output f(x,y) but
nothing else, correctness, meaning that the output received is indeed f(x,y) and not
something else, and independence of inputs, meaning that neither party can choose
its input as a function of the other party's.
1.1.4 Comparison (Millionaires Problem)
The \Millionaires Problem" was introduced by Yao in [78] as motivation for secure
computation: two millionaires want to securely compare their respective private
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Figure 1.1: Data ow in VPP with ve layer structure consisting of party layer,
virtual party layer, trusted anonymizer layer, untrusted anonymizer layer and com-
putation layer from starting to end respectively [52].
input values without revealing more information than the outcome of the comparison
to the other party (e.g., about their amount of money, in which two parties are
millionaires and two millionaires want to know who is richer without letting each
other know about the amount of money they have). Yao's Garbled Circuit (GC)
protocol (cf. §1.2) is the most ecient solution to solve the Millionaires problem.
1.1.5 Secure Multi-party Computation Using Virtual Party
Virtual Party Protocol (VPP) can be used to ensure the privacy preserving the data
input by not revealing the right data. In this protocol some fake data and some vir-
tual party are created. There are n parties P1,P2,P3...,Pn. Each party Pi has data
Xi1,Xi2,Xi3...,Xim. Each party Pi has some trusted anonymizers Ai1,Ai2,Ai3...,AiX
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and Z number of un-trusted anonymizers A1,A2,A3...,AZ. Each party Pi will create
some fake data Fi1,Fi2,Fi3...,Fiq, where q is the total number of fake data entries.
Each Party Pi will also create K virtual parties Pi1,Pi2,Pi3...,PiK. Then the value
of each data Di1,Di2,Di3...,Di(m+q) is encrypted and distributed randomly among the
virtual parties. Corresponding modier tokens for every Pi is also created that are
mixed with fake data. These modier tokens are distributed randomly among the
virtual parties that will be used in the nal computation to obtain the correct re-
sult. These parties will send their data to trusted anonymizers. Trusted anonymizers
distribute their data randomly among the un-trusted anonymizers and the data of
un-trusted anonymizers is sent to third party. Third party will use the data and the
modier tokens to compute the result.
The whole scenario of encryption, modier tokens, encrypted data and the method
of computation can be seen in Figure 1.1.
1.1.6 Secure Multi-party Computation Using Secure Sum
Protocol
In Secure Sum Computation Protocol proposed by Clifon et al. [65] all the parties
want to know the sum of their individual data inputs. In this protocol parties put
in a unidirectional ring and one of these parties is selected as a protocol initiator
party. Probability of data leakage is reduced to zero by changing the positions of the
parties in the ring. Randomization method is used in this protocol for computing
the sum as described below:
The computation will be started by choosing a random number and add its own
data input. The sum is then transmitted to the next party. The next party adds
the received sum to own data and then sends this new sum to the next party. This
procedure is repeated until the protocol initiator receives the sum of all the data and
the random number. The random number is known only to the protocol initiator
party, Thus it subtracts the random number from the sum and allows all the parties
to know the result.
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Figure 1.2: Secure Sum Protocol [65].
All scenario of this protocol are depicted in Figure 1.2 where parties where parties
P0, P1, P2 and P3 with their data 10,8,7 and 15 perform secure sum computation.
Initiator party P0 selects a random number R=5 and sends to P1 the sum of this
random number and its private data (10). Also the new sum 23 can be resulted by
adding the data of P1 (8) and previous sum (15). This process is repeated until the
sum 45 is received by P0. P0 can subtract random number from 45 and send the
nal sum as 40 to all the parties.
1.1.7 Secure Multi-party Computation Using Secret Shar-
ing Schemes
Where participation of president and his highest ranking is required to unlock the
trigger for the nuclear missile, we call this secret sharing in cryptography.
Secret sharing is used as one of the secure protocols for solving the multi-party
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computation problem. This protocol involves a set of n parties fP1,... Png, a dealer
who has a secret, and a collection of subsets of parties called the access structure.
A secret is divided into n shares, and they are privately given to n parties. An
access structure is a monotone collection A  2fP1;:::Png of subset of fP1,... Png.
A collection A is monotone if B2A and B C imply that C2A. Sets in A are
called authorized subsets and sets not in A are called unauthorized subsets. Access
structure is a method of sharing a secret S among a set of K participants (parties)
P in such a way that the following two properties are satised:
 If an authorized subset of parties pool their shares, then they can determine the
value of S.
 If an authorized subset of parties pool their shares, then they can determine
nothing about the value of S.
1.2 Yao's Garbled Circuit Protocol
In the mid 1980's, Yao proposed a rst approach for addressing two-party Secure
Computation [78, 79]. Yao's garbled circuit is a way to "encrypt a computation" that
reveals only the output of the computation, but reveals nothing about the inputs or
any intermediate values. In this section we introduce some standard notation and
concepts corresponding to Garbled Circuit protocol (§1.2.1) and then Yao's garbled
circuit protocol is explained in several steps (§1.2.2).
1.2.1 Basic Concepts and Denitions
In this section we introduce common denitions, function to circuit, Boolean Circuit,
Bit-String, Garbled Values and Oblivious Transfer Protocol used in this thesis.
Function to Circuit
According to Goldreich et al. in [31] it is possible to map any poly-time func-
tion f with xed size input to a Boolean circuit C consisting of digital gates
(AND,OR,NOT,..) that returns the same result.
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Boolean Circuits
Boolean circuits are classical and standard representations for functions which are
particularly useful for SMC. A Boolean circuit consists of n-input gates Gn and wires
that performs a mapping from n input bits to one output bit, i.e.,
Gn : (in1; :::; inn) 2 f0; 1g
n ! f0; 1g:
Boolean circuit is an acyclic (i.e., loop-free or feed-forward) graph used as a math-
ematical model of digital logic circuits, dened in terms of the logic gates.
Every gate that is used in Boolean circuit construction creates a cost. Thus, if we
reduce the number of gates, we can reduce the cost involved in it. Generic gates are
AND, OR, NOT, XNOR, XOR.
Bit-Strings
Bit string is a sequence of bits, which denes and represents sets of binary data that
are numbered from zero to the number of bits in the string less one. The length of
a bit string is also dened as the number of bits that it contains. f0, 1gl dened the
space of binary strings of length l. A bit string can also contain zero or more bits.
Garbled Values
Computations in a GC are not performed on obvious values 0 or 1, but on random
bit strings, called garbled values. In construction of the GC, two random bit strings
(garbled values) k0x, k
1
x are assigned to each wire xi of C. Two random bit strings,
which are assigned to the corresponding value 0 and 1, do not disclose to them as
they are chosen randomly.
1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer Protocol (OT)
A foundation building block for almost all ecient protocols of secure computation
is 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocol [56, 25] that consists of two phases:
the Transferring phase and the opening phase. Oblivious Transfer protocol works
between two parties, a Sender (Alice) and a receiver (Bob). This protocol is called
1-out-of-2 since the receiver learns one of the 2 inputs of the sender and forget any
information.
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Figure 1.3: The Oblivious Transfer Protocol.
In the transferring phase, the goal of the sender (Alice) is to send a message (in
general, a bit-string) to another party (Bob) in such a way that he can decide to
obtain one of the 2 inputs of the sender at his choice but not both. In the opening
phase, the goal of the receiver (Bob) is to open the message, but the sender never
nds which message Bob received.
As you can see in Figure 1.3, a sender (Alice) has two messages (x0,x1). She sends a
one-bit message to another party (Bob) in such a way that he can decide to obtain
one of the two messages according to his choosing bit (r). The result is that the
receiver learn xr without learning anything about sender's bit while the sender learn
nothing about r. Alice never nds out which message Bob received and remain
totally ignorant about which of the two messages he received.
1.2.2 Description of Yao's Garbled Circuit Protocol
Yao's GC construction, often called Garbled Boolean Circuit (GBC) introduces a
protocol for the evaluation of the input function (f ) represented as a Boolean Circuit
and is based on the encryption of the input and intermediate values, so that only
the nal result is shared among the parties.
Yao's Garbled Circuit construction is composed of two phases: Garbling and Evalu-
ation, which are distinctly executed by the two parties. During the Garbling phase,
Alice converts a circuit into a garbled circuit, while Bob performs the Evaluation
phase taking in input the garbled circuit, executing some interactions with Alice,
and nally computing the output value.
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If we want to be a little more precise, a "garbling scheme" consists of the following
steps:
 Alice generates a circuit representation C of function f.
 Alice transforms the circuit to a garbled Circuit representation by garbling every
gate.
 Alice sends Garbled Circuit and her key to Bob.
 Alice and Bob perform 1-out-of-2 OTs to receive Bob's key.
 Bob evaluates the Garbled Circuit and outputs the results.
1.2.2.1 Generate Garbled Boolean Circuit
To generate the garbled Boolean circuit Alice selects and associates k-bit-string
random keys to each input and output wire and for each possible value. She generates
the random keys k0x, k
1
x for input wire x and k
0
y, k
1
y for input wire y and k
0
z, k
1
z for
output wire z. She puts these random keys for each wire and make \Garbled Boolean
Circuit". In this encrypt circuit, inputs and outputs of each gates are masked such
that the parties cannot gain any information about input or intermediate result.
This process is repeated for each gate composing the Boolean circuit. Encryption
is important because it helps the outputs to look random and additionally prevents
Bob from obtaining further information.
1.2.2.2 Generate Garbled Truth Table
Alice also encrypts the truth table of the gate using those random keys and sends the
garbled truth table to Bob. She should cooperate with Bob to know about actual
output. An initial table for an XOR gate and resulting garbled truth table is shown
below in Figure 1.4 and Table 1.1.
1.2.2.3 Sending Alice's Garbled Values
Once that Alice has generated the garbled circuit she needs to dene her own input
values to send to Bob, then Alice selects the appropriate input keys for the garbled
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Figure 1.4: XOR gate with its corresponding wire keys.
Table 1.1: Initial garbled circuit table for XOR gate
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circuit GC. Alice sends to Bob all the keys corresponding to the values she owns for
each gate. Following the previous example, if Alice's rst input bit is 0, she needs
to send the garbled representation k0x. This process is repeated for all Alice's input
bits, generating Alice's garbled input values and sending them together with the
garbled circuit GC to Bob.
1.2.2.4 Using OT for Bob's Input Values
Now Bob needs the keys corresponding to his input value. Alice knows the keys
for each possible input value but she does not know Bob's choice of input values,
therefore they engage in a 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocol for each in-
put value from Bob to decrypt the corresponding entries in the garbled truth table.
Thus, Bob and Alice execute an OT once per each input wire. After performing
OT as many times as needed, Bob ends with all the information that he needs to
evaluate the circuit.
As mentioned before, the Oblivious Transfer protocol in Yao's construction, is ex-
ploited to transfer information between the two parties when evaluating the GBC.
Specically, all the inputs are encrypted and during the evaluation the output of
each gate the decryption keys are exchanged, so that none of the two parties learns
any information about the inputs of the other party. For each gate, an Oblivious
Transfer (OT) protocol is run between the two parties so that the resulting output
value can be computed without knowing the input value of the other party.
To see how \1-out-of-2" OT is used to compute the GC, let consider W1, .., Wu1
be the circuit input wires corresponding to input held by Alice, and let Wu1+1 , ..,
Wu1+u2 be the circuit input wires corresponding to input held by Bob. Then:
(a) Alice sends to Bob the garbled values W1
x1 , .., Wu1
xu1 .
(b)For every
i 2 1; ::; u2
Alice and Bob execute the 1-out-of-2 OT protocol, where Alice's input is (k0
u1+i ,
k1
u1+i ), and Bob's input is yi. Bob now has the garbled tables and the garblings of
all circuit's input wires. Bob evaluates the garbled circuit, and outputs f(x, y).
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1.2.2.5 Evaluating the Garbled Circuit
Finally, Bob will determine the corresponding output key that he can share to Alice
to nd out what the actual outputs were. The important note is that Bob can
share just a nal output with Alice and she does not have any information about
Bob's value or any intermediate values during the protocol, and Bob doesn't know
the input values of Alice and the intermediate values of the computation, which are
randomly chosen values.
1.3 Ecient GC-based Secure Multi-Party Com-
putation (SMC)
The total Oblivious Transfer (OT) payload and GC protocol runtime increases lin-
early with the number of gates, and can be huge for complex GBCs. Accordingly,
the ecient GC-based Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMC) protocol is of crucial
importance. We will introduce Free XORs method for improving Garbled Circuit
eciency in §1.3.1.
1.3.1 Free-XOR Protocol
An optimization of the basic GC construction has been proposed by Kolesnikov et
al.[37]. In the modied protocol the evaluation of XOR gates comes \for free", in
the sense that they do not require any communication for the generation and the
evaluation of the associated garbled table.
The basic idea for the circuit generator is to keep a global random bit string R such
that for every wire only the labelW0 (representing 0) needs to be randomly sampled
while the label W1 (representing 1) is simply set to W0  R for every binary XOR
gate (with input wires subscripted with i, j and the output wire with k), the label
representing 0 on the output wire is derived from xor-ing corresponding input labels,
i.e.,
Wk
0 =Wi
0 Wj
0.
The implementation of the XOR gate, we will follow step-by-step Kolesnikov's im-
provement [KS08] which works as follows.
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1.3.1.1.Garbling
In the rst step, Alice computes the garbled Boolean circuit (GBC) as follows:
1.a Randomly choose global key oset,
R 2 Rf0; 1g
N
1.b For each input wire Wi of C:
(a) Randomly choose a garbled value
w0i = <k
0
i; p
0
i> 2 f0; 1g
N+1 (keyk 2 f0; 1gN; p 2 f0; 1g)
(b) Set the other garbled output value
w1i = <k
1
i; p
1
i> = k
0
1 R; p
0
i  1
1.c For each gate Gi of C in topological order
(a) label G(i) with its index: label (Gi) = i
(b) If Gi is an XOR-gate Wc = XOR(Wa, Wb) with garbled input values
w0a = <k
0
a; p
0
a>
w0b = <k
0
b; p
0
b>
w1a = <k
1
a; p
1
a>
w1b = <k
1
b; p
1
b>
Set garbled output value
w0c = k
0
a  k
0
b; pa  pb
Set garbled output value w1c = k
0
a  k
0
b  R; pa  pb  1
(c) If Gi is a 2-input gate Wc = gi(Wa, Wb) with garbled input values
w0a = <k
0
a; p
0
a>
w0b = <k
0
b; p
0
b>
w1a = <k
1
a; p
1
a>
w1b = <k
1
b; p
1
b>
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Randomly choose garbled output value
w0c = <k
0
c; p
0
c> 2 Rf0; 1g
N+1
Set garbled output value
w1c = <k
1
c; p
1
c> = k
0
c R; p
0
c  1
Create Gi's garbled table. For each of 22 possible combinations of Gi's input values
va; vb 2 f0; 1g; set
eva,vb= H (k
va
a k k
vb
b k i) W
gi(va,vb)
Sort entries e in the table by the input pointers, i.e. place entry eva,vb in position
<hp vaa , pvab >
1.d.For each circuit-output wire Wi(the output of gate Gj ) with garblings
w0i = <k
0
i , p
0
i >, w
1
i = <k
1
i , p
1
i >:
(a) Create garbled output table for both possible wire values
v 2 f0; 1g:
(b) Set ev= H (ki
v k "out" k j) v
(c) Sort entries e in the table by the input pointers, i.e.
place entry ev in position p
v
i. There is no conict, since
p1i = p
0
i  1:
In this rst phase, Alice executes Kolesnikov's algorithm and uses the output of H,
modeled as a Random Oracle [6], to encrypt the garbled output values in the garbled
(Step 1.d(b)). Any combination of H's inputs (keys and gate indices) is used for the
encryption of at most one table entry.
Alice sends the encrypted circuit to the other party, the garbled circuit evaluator
(henceforth called Bob). When Bob receives the garbled circuit he only knows one
garbled value per wire, and can decrypt exactly one entry of Gi's garbled table. All
other entries are encrypted with at least one key that Bob does not have. Therefore,
one of the two of garbled values of every wire looks random to him.
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1.3.1.2. Evaluating
We now discuss Kolesnikov's GC evaluation algorithm, run by Bob. Bob receives
all garbled tables, but cannot execute the randomized circuit unless it has the input
values to feed to it. Alice sends her inputs to Bob through the Oblivious Transfer
protocol (OT)
1.4 Compiling Tools for Implementation of Two-
Party Secure Computation Protocols
While the theoretical foundations of two-party Secure Computation have been con-
sidered in [78], interest in practical SMC systems is growing and dierent privacy-
preserving frameworks are being developed [63], [64]. So, recent implementation's
tool show that SFE is ready to be used in practical applications. To make SMC
usable by automatically generating protocols from high-level descriptions, several
frameworks for SMC consisting of languages and corresponding tools have been
developed in the last years. We review some of these tools, Fairplay (§1.4.1) and
CBFS-MPC (§1.4.2) that are used in our thesis and SCAPI (§1.4.3), TASTY (§1.4.4)
and ABY (§1.4.5).
1.4.1 FAIRPLAY
A number of well-established frameworks have been presented to translate the the-
oretical results of SMC protocol into practical applications. Fairplay1 [43] was one
of the rst library published for synthesizing GC starting from the denition of
the input function. It provides a method to compile given function in a high-level
language into a low-level language as a circuit. Indeed, the framework includes a
high-level Secure Function Denition Language (SFDL) for specifying the computed
function. The denition is then compiled into a low-level description in form of a
Boolean Circuit. The language used for describing the Boolean Circuit is called
Secure Hardware Denition Language (SHDL). The corresponding Garbled Circuit
(GC) is created from the Boolean Circuit and a garbled version of the input data is
generated from the original input.
1http://www.cs.huji.ac.il/project/Fairplay/
36
1.4.1.1 Fairplay Syntax using Example
Let us consider as a simple example the SFDL description of a 2-bit Adder:
program Add f
typeint = Int 2;
typeAliceInput = int;
typeBobInput = int;
typeAliceOutput = int;
typeBobOutput = int;
type Output = struct AliceOutputalice, BobOutput bob;
type Input = struct AliceInputalice, BobInput bob;
function Output output(Input input) f
output.alice = (input.bob + input.alice);
output.bob = (input.bob + input.alice);g
g
The compiler, having in input the SFDL program produces the following circuit
in SHDL format:
0 input //output$input.bob$0
1 input //output$input.bob$1
2 input //output$input.alice$0
3 input //output$input.alice$1
4 gate arity 2 table [0 0 0 1] inputs [2 0]
5 output gate arity 2 table [0 1 1 0] inputs [2 0] //output$output.alice$0
6 gate arity 2 table [0 1 1 0] inputs [3 1]
7 output gate arity 2 table [0 1 1 0] inputs [4 6] /output$output.alice$1
8 output gate arity 1 table [0 1] inputs [5] //output$output.bob$0
9 output gate arity 1 table [0 1] inputs [7] //output$output.bob$1
Each line species a wire in the generated circuit and shows input bit or a Boolean
gate with its truth-table, e.g. table [0 1 1 0] shows XOR gate, table [0 0 0 1] shows
AND gate, table [0 1] shows NOT gate.
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1.4.2 CBFS-MPC
Circuits of Basic Functions Suitable for Multi-Party Computation (CBFS-MPC)2is
a tool developed by the Bristol cryptography group. This tool is a set of basic
combinatorial circuits, which may be useful for testing binary-circuit based SMC and
two-party computation. They use Cadence Encounter RTL3 compiler in conjunction
with the Faraday FSA0A C 0.18 mm ASIC Standard Cell Library4 for synthesis.
The resulting circuit reports the number of AND, XOR and INV gates for each
circuit design in a given format, where each line contains in order the number of
input wires, number of output wires, list of input wires and list of output wires, and
the gate type ( XOR, AND, or INV). For example, 2 1 3 4 5 XOR means that w5
= XOR (w3,w4).
1.4.3 SCAPI
Secure Computation API (SCAPI)5 [21] is an open-source Java library (also has a
c++ version) for implementing secure two-party and multiparty computation proto-
cols. The main advantages of this framework are exibility, extendibility, eciency
and ease of use. Its exibility means that protocols implemented using SCAPI can
be easily changed and replaced because of using primitives and sub-protocols in an
abstract way. Extendibility means that the design of SCAPI ensure that any new
implementations of primitives and sub-protocols that are even more ecient can be
utilized in all existing protocols even if they were previously implemented. SCAPI
can achieve also ecient property by supporting of highly ecient low-level libraries
using JNI. Finally, because of focusing on keeping SCAPI easy to build and use, it
has property of "ease of use".
Libscapi is developed by Bar Ilan University Cryptography Research Group that
try to promote investigate in Academy and Industry practitioners by providing e.g.,
high performance implementation on standard Linux and using modern techniques
like Pipelining and TCP optimization and providing a common platform for bench-
2https://www.cs.bris.ac.uk/Research/CryptographySecurity/MPC/
3https://www.cadence.com/content/cadence/
4http://freelibrary.faraday-tech.com
5https://github.com/cryptobiu/libscapi
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marking dierent algorithms and implementation.
1.4.4 TASTY
Tool for Automating Secure Two-partY computations (TASTY) [32] is used for de-
scribing, generating and compiling ecient secure two-party computation protocols
that can generate protocols based on Homomorphic Encryption (HE) [71] and Gar-
bled Circuit (GC) as well as combinations of both. HE can perform ecient addition
and multiplication functions, whereas GC is better for non-linear functionality such
as comparison function. By combining both HE and GC, it can provide optimiza-
tions for practical secure two-party computation with low latency and allows to
automatically generate ecient secure protocols for many privacy-preserving appli-
cations, e.g., face recognition and remote diagnostics.
1.4.5 ABY
ABY6 is a framework for ecient mixed-protocol secure two-party computation
based on Arithmetic sharing, Boolean sharing, and Yao's garbled circuits. It can
also provide highly ecient computation based on pre-computed oblivious transfer
extensions7 and combine protocols.
1.5 Related Work.
Several approaches have been considered in the last few years [55, 33, 41, 69, 38],
for improving communication running time in two-party secure computation using
garbled circuit (GC) protocol.
The proposed approach in 2009 by Benny Pinkas and Thomas Schneider [55], presents
a number of optimisations which reduce the eective size of the circuit and size of
the garbled table (GT) by 50 percent, which can result in improving the commu-
nication cost for transmitting the circuit between the parties. They modeled the
underlying key derivations (KDFs) as correlation robust using the Free-XOR tech-
nique [37] (§1.3.1), which in this situation they are able to reduce the data needed
6https://github.com/encryptogroup/ABY
7https://github.com/encryptogroup/OTExtension
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to be sent for the other gates by 25 percent. Indeed, using the free-XOR gates
result in 3=4(1-p)N amount of data needed to be sent per circuit gate, where N
denotes the amount of data needed to be sent for circuit in the Yao construction
and P illustrates the proportion of XOR gates within a circuit. This approach pro-
vided the rst secure two-party evaluation of the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) circuit using Fairplay compiler [43] (§1.4.1), considered as a highly complex
(around 30,000 AND and XOR gates) function (also with some potential applica-
tions), taking around 20 minutes to compute and requiring 160 circuits to obtain a
2 40 cheating probability.
Another method with the aim of improving eciency and scalability of garbled
circuit was proposed in 2011 [33] that provides a exible framework for faster secure
two-party computation. In this approach, it is not necessary to generate and store
the entire garbled circuit in memory and allows users to build and evaluate the cir-
cuit modularly. Therefore, very complex circuits can be evaluated, generated and
debugged. Also, they could get improve in eciency and scalability by pipelining
the process of circuit generation and evaluation. Thus, this simple pipelining ap-
proach result in minimizing circuit size and scalability of the garbled circuit, has led
to the development of several complex protocols that make evaluation faster than
previous work. E.g., the total number of non-free XOR gates for the entire AES-128
computation was 9280 and the overall time was 0.2 seconds that was 16 times faster
than the best previous results.
In 2012, Kreuter et al.[38] focused on parallel implementations design based on
garbled circuits to be run on CPUs with many cores. Their proposed circuit con-
sisting of about 6 billion gates; and they could implement running this on 512 cores
of powerful cluster computer. They used better optimized circuit compiler than
Fairplay and previous method [55]; with several new optimizations such as pipelin-
ing, which was suitable for more complicated circuits to reduce the computation
time. The time to compute AES was reduced to 1.4 second per block, because of
beginning transmission of the GC across the network, while the rest of the circuit is
still being generated.
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Another research group in 2013 investigated on using consumer-grade Graphics pro-
cessing unit (GPUs) to achieve similar levels of parallelism [28]. They used OT
extension techniques [34, 3] to design their GPU-specic protocol and achieve com-
parable eciency to the cluster computing implementation, which results in reducing
the number of gates in implementation of the AES to 50,000.
The TinyGarble method is another method, introduced by Ebrahim M.Songhori
and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi et al.[69] in 2015. TinyGarble8 illustrates a high degree
of compactness and scalability while using a sequential circuit description for garbled
circuit (GC) protocol. It can compress the memory footprint of garbling operation
while resulting in fewer cache misses and less CPU cycles. TinyGarble introduced
new techniques based on a sequential circuit for synthesizing and optimizing of gar-
bled circuit (GC) protocol, which result in minimizing the number of non-XOR gates
and improving computation and communication time. The most signicant advan-
tage of TinyGarble is describing the function in a compact format as a sequential
logic instead of combinational format (i.e., user can compress the 1024-bit addition
function into only a 1-bit adder).Also, the total number of gates using this method
for the entire AES-128 computation was 2588 and number of non-XOR gates was
576, which is the best result until now. We can say that TinyGarble introduces the
concept of sequential circuits that consist of circuits and loops, where at execution
time the loops are unrolled resulting in a combinational circuit that is evaluated
with Yao's garbled circuit protocol.
8https://github.com/esonghori/TinyGarble
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Chapter 2
Introduction to Quantum Gates
\When we get to the very, very small world (say circuits of seven atoms) we have a
lot of new things that would happen that represent completely new opportunities for
design. Atoms on a small scale behave like nothing on a large scale, for they satisfy
the laws of quantum mechanics. So, as we go down and ddle around with the atoms
down there, we are working with dierent laws, and we can expect to do dierent
things. We can manufacture in dierent ways. We can use, not just circuits, but
some system involving the quantized energy levels, or the interactions of quantized
spins." { Richard P. Feynman
This chapter consists of four sections. In the rst section, we will discuss about
some of the key aspects of quantum mechanics needed for quantum computation
(§2.1). This section introduces the basic denitions and notations of quantum me-
chanics and their characteristics like quantum states and quantum bit (see §2.1.1
and §2.1.2). We will also give some feeling about mathematical formalisms needed to
work with quantum computation. Quantum key distribution will be describe in §2.2
and section §2.3 gives the background on reversible and quantum circuits required
for this dissertation. Following these sections, we have explained the simulation tool
for the design of the quantum circuit in §2.4.
2.1 Quantum Mechanics
This section discusses how quantum mechanics can be used to perform computa-
tions and how these computations make a quantum computer dierent from a con-
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ventional computer. For more information about quantum mechanics, see [13, 23].
In the early 1980's [26], Richard Feynman observed that computation, in general,
could be done more eciently if we use quantum mechanical eects. Considering
on basic principles of quantum mechanics help us to explain where the power of
quantum computer comes from.
In quantum systems, because of the exponential increase in computational space
and the number of processors, and hence an exponential increase in the amount of
physical space needed, we can have an exponential decrease in the time required
for computation, programming, and complexity. Therefore, in quantum systems,
we can have an exponential increase in parallelism with the size of the system [16].
According to this characteristic, quantum computing is separated from conventional
computing.
2.1.1 Quantum State
In quantum computing, Information is encoded in the form of quantum states that
are described in terms of vectors or in the more compact bra/ket notation ji invented
by Dirac [17].
2.1.2 Quantum Bit (Qubit)
In classical computing, bit is the basic element used to store information, which can
be in one of the two states of 0 or 1. In quantum computing, this basic element is
called a quantum bit (qubit). Qubit is denoted by Dirac notation, which is a unit
vector in a two-dimensional complex vector space that indicated by fj0i,j1ig. j0i
and j1i could correspond to the spin-up and spin-down states of an electron. In
contrast to a classical bit, a qubit is able to be in two quantum states containing 0,
1 at the same time (often called superposition). The quantum state of a qubit as a
superposition of the two quantum basis states j0i and j1i is shown in Equation 2.1.
j i =  j0i +  j1i (2.1)
 and  are complex numbers such that jj2 + jj2 = 1. Superposition state is
measured according to the basic f j0i,j1ig. The value j0i is measured with a prob-
ability of jj2 and the result j1i is obtained with a probability of jj2. As shown
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Figure 2.1: The qubit state as a Bloch sphere presentation [62].
in Equation 2.2, each unit vector illustrates the state of qubit in a two-dimensional
complex vector space [49, 62].
j i =
0
@ 

1
A , j0i =
0
@ 1
0
1
A , j1i =
0
@ 0
1
1
A (2.2)
The state of a quantum bit (qubit) can also be a point on the surface of a sphere
called Bloch sphere [49] as shown in Figure 2.1 and can also be written as shown in
Equation 2.3.
j i = cos 
2
j0i + ei'sin 
2
j1i (2.3)
2.1.3 Quantum Key Distribution
In 1984, Bennet and Brassard [9, 8] considered the rst quantum key distribution
process, in which private keys on insecure channels can be transferred by sequences
of single qubits.
Supposing that Alice and Bob want to agree on a secret key and communicate
with each other privately. So, they are connected by the open classical channel and
a uni-directional quantum channel that can be accessible by Eve, who wants to listen
to their conversation. The process is illustrated Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Quantum key distribution process [58].
Alice, through the quantum channel, sends photons to Bob, who can measure the
quantum state. Eve also tries to measure the state of these photons and resend them
to Bob. To establish a secret key, Alice sends a sequence of bits to Bob and encodes
each bit in the quantum state of a photon that can be measured by Bob. Alice and
Bob can identify those bits, which they have agreed for sending, receiving and using
these bits as the key. The listener (Eve) can measure the state of this transmitted
photon and resend new photons to Bob. Thus, Eve can use the wrong basis and
resend the bit with this wrong basis. So, any listener on the quantum channel can
use it for introducing a high error rate that Alice and Bob could detect by commu-
nicating their keys through the channel. Other proposed techniques for considering
the quantum eects for key distribution have been introduced in [8, 22, 42].
2.2 Quantum Logic
One import fact is that quantum transformations are unitary and quantum gates
inherently reversible. So, In this section at rst, we have discussed about the re-
versibility property in designing quantum logics and quantum circuits. Finally, some
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common quantum(reversible) gates that are used in this thesis are introduced.
2.2.1 Reversible Computing
In 1973 Bennet [7] showed that energy dissipation problem of VLSI circuits can be
circumvented by using reversible logic.
Quantum logic gates are inherently reversible and quantum circuits are built based
on reversible logic circuits. A reversible logic circuit is realized by a cascade of re-
versible gates. A gate that implements one to one mapping between n inputs and
n outputs are called a nÖn reversible logic gate that can be represented as shown
in Equation (2.4), where Iv and Ov are the input and output vector.
Iv = (x 1,x 2, x 3,....x n) , Ov = (y1,y2, y3,....yn) (2.4)
The reversible logic gate must have the same number of inputs and outputs, and
for each input pattern there must be a unique output pattern [7]. Reversible logic
circuits avoid energy loss by \un computing" the computed information using recy-
cling the energy in the system [7].
Synthesis of the quantum or reversible logic circuits in compared to the synthe-
sis of the traditional irreversible logic circuits has two restrictions that should be
mentioned [29, 54]:
 In the reversible logic, the fan-out of each signal is equal to one.
 Feedback from gate outputs to inputs is not permitted.
A completely or incompletely-specied irreversible function can be embedded into
a reversible function by adding extra inputs/outputs. The extra input bits (qubits)
are called constant inputs and the extra output bits (qubits) are called garbage
outputs. As an example, consider conventional irreversible XOR gate and its truth
table shown in Figure 2.3, and reversible XOR gate and its truth table (P as a
garbage output) shown in Figure 2.4.
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(a) Conventional XOR gate. (b) XOR gate.
Figure 2.3: Conventional XOR gates (gate and truth table).
(a) Reversible XOR gate. (b) R-XOR gate.
Figure 2.4: Reversible XOR gates (gate and truth table).
Figure 2.5: Quantum NOT gate.
2.2.2 Quantum Gates
Classical circuits are composed of logic "gates" connected by wires, information is
transmitted through these wires as electric power. Consequently, quantum circuits
consist of a set of "quantum gates" to inputs and kept qubits as an information.
Quantum gates are also reversible because quantum transformations should be uni-
tary. We here introduce some quantum(reversible) gates that are used in this work.
 NOT Gate: A 1 * 1 quantum NOT gate is similar to the conventional NOT
gate. It has one input and one output and inverts the input values. As shown
in Figure 2.5, circuit representation of this gate in the middle is symbolised
by the  sign.
 CNOT Gate: A 2 * 2 quantum gate, which is closely related to the NOT gate,
is the two-bit Controlled-NOT (or C-NOT ) gate or Feynman gate [27]. The
C-NOT gate performs a NOT on the second input if and only if the rst input
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Figure 2.6: Quantum XOR gate.
is 1. Note that the CNOT gate, also called XOR gate, performs an exclusive
OR operation between the two input bits, as depicted in Figure 2.6.
 Tooli Gate: A 3 * 3 Tooli quantum gate [73] is shown in Figure 2.7. It is
also denoted as controlled-controlled-not (or CC-NOT) gate, since the third
output is the inverse of the third input if and only if the rst two inputs are
equal to 1. A Tooli gate is universal, i.e., for any reversible Boolean function
f there exists a circuit containing only Tooli gates that represents f.
Tooli gates are important blocks in quantum circuits. In fact, a large number
of reversible logic synthesis methods use NN Tooli gates as TOFn (x 1,x 2,
x 3,....x n) where x n is the target line and the rst N-l lines are controls [45].
The main reason for popularity of Tooli gates over the other gates is their
completeness and relativeness in using them. TOF1(x 1) is the special case
where there are no control inputs, so x 1 is always an inverter, i.e., It is a
NOT gate. TOF2(x 1,x 2) has been termed a Feynman or controlled NOT gate
(CNOT). TOF3(x 1,x 2,x 3) is often referred to simply as a Tooli gate.
A quantum gate library contains a functionally complete set of reversible gates.
A set containing NOT and CNOT gates are not functionally complete, i.e.,
there exist functions that cannot be computed by these gates. Adding Tooli
gates to the previous set we get the NCT library, which is one of the most
common quantum libraries. Since Tooli gate is universal, we can represent
any reversible Boolean function through the NCT library.
 Peres Gate: A 3 * 3 Peres quantum gate Peres gate (PG) [53], also known as
New Tooli Gate (NTG) combining Tooli gate and Feynman gate. Since the
Peres gate (PG) quantum cost 1is less than Tooli gate (TG) the Peres gate is
1Quantum Cost (QC):The number of (1*1) or (2*2) reversible gates used in the circuit.
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Figure 2.7: Quantum Tooli gate.
Figure 2.8: Quantum Peres gate.
Figure 2.9: Quantum TR gate.
used every- where instead of the Tooli gate [45]. This gate is shown in Figure
2.8.
 TR Gate: The TR gate [72] is the inverse of the Peres gate and its operation on
the qubits and its quantum implementation are illustrated in Figure 2.9.
2.3 RevKit: Tool for the Design of Quantum Cir-
cuits
The open source toolkit RevKit2 [66] is a tool for synthesis, optimization, simula-
tion, verication and testing of quantum (and reversible) circuits [76]. Besides it
provides elaborated methods for synthesis, optimization, and verication of basic
functionality like parsers and export functions. One important property of this tool
2http://revkit.org/
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is its extensibility, meaning that it can be re-implemented in order to modify or
improve the given algorithms. So, RevKit is a extendable framework with signi-
cant number of approaches and algorithms, but can easily provide the addition of
new methods and algorithms. In this thesis, we used RevKit for minimizing the
Boolean functions in the quantum framework, and for counting the number of XOR
and non-XOR gates in the obtained quantum circuits.
Example: For instance, considering the quantum implementation of the simple
function f=(a+b)c, in RevKit that implement this function as following descrip-
tions :
revkit> expr [fabgc]
revkit> convert  expr to spec
revkit> exs
revkit> ps {c
then we can have these results for number of gates and number of qubits:
Lines: 4 (1 line is belongs to constant input and 3 lines for inputs)
Gates: 4
Logic qubits: 4
We can write simple expressions in RevKit using expr3 command. The expres-
sions only support binary operators. It should be considered that for binary AND
we use ( ), for XOR we use [ ], for OR we use f g, for NOT we use!.Therefore, we have
[fabgc] for dening f= (a+b)c function. Afterwards, we can call several synthesis
algorithms4, e.g., exs, tbs, rms, and dbs. Transforming expression to quantum spec-
ication (expr > spec) is an alias5. So, we need to set convert {expr to spec to
use alias. Using ps gives us statistical information about the function. Then we can
convert the expression into a reversible circuit using (it will automatically embed).
Also, we can see the following circuit in output (see Figure 2.10).
In this simple example we have that the quantum implementation of the given
3https://msoeken.github.io/cirkit doc.html#datastructuresexpressions
4https://msoeken.github.io/cirkit doc.html
5https://msoeken.github.io/cirkit doc.html#getting-started-aliases
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Figure 2.10: Quantum Implementation of function f=(a+b)c using RevKit
Commands Description
expr Expressions for dening Boolean functions
Spec Quantum specication
ps Print statistical information about the function
convert Convert each data structure to another ones
Table 2.1: RevKit Commands
function has 3 CNOT (XOR) gates and 1 Tooli gate. Table 2.1 presents some
typical RevKit commands with their descriptions.
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Chapter 3
Boolean Function Representation
Boolean Function representation in electronic design automation (EDA) tools is the
main way to design ecient hardware. Logic representation, on the one hand, try
to have the fewest number of primitive elements (literals, nodes, etc.) in order to
implement with a small memory footprint. On the other hand, logic presentation
must be simple enough to run and execute. We use standard representations for
Boolean functions which are particularly useful for SMC protocols. In this chapter,
we focus on Boolean function representation as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) and
binary decision diagrams (BDDs) and we will also explain Multiple-Valued logic
(MV).
Boolean Function Synthesis. Any Boolean function can be represented using
an expression containing AND, OR and NOT operations. Boolean functions can
also take in multiple Boolean variables. "0' represents "false" and "1' represents
"True". Also, it can be represented using an expression cntaining only NAND op-
erations.
Boolean Function Representation. Boolean functions can be represented and
manipulated in many ways. We are going to see logic function representation using
truth table (TT) method and Boolean expression forms of DNF and CNF below.
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3.1 Truth Tables
The rst denition of truth table (TT) was introduced by Ludwig Wittgenstein and
published in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP) book. A truth table (TT) is
a mathematical table prepared from the specic Boolean function, which sets the
functional values as Boolean expressions. Consider an n-variable function:
f(x1,....,xn), (xi=0,1, i=1,...,n)
Truth table (TT) consists of one column for each input variables (minterms) and
one column showing possible results of operation for those values. Each of the 2n
possible combinations of the n variables called minterms, and a function can be
represented by all the minterms that appear their evaluation as 1.
3.2 DNF and CNF forms
Every Boolean function can be written as a Boolean expression forms of Disjunctive
Normal Form (DNF) and Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF).
Let a term be the disjunction ("or") of a collection of variables. A Boolean ex-
pression is in disjunctive normal form (DNF) if the variables within each term are
ANDed together, and the terms are ORed together. We can say that these Boolean
expressions are in sum-of-product (SOP) form, meaning that they are the sum (OR)
of a set of products (AND). (SOP) form [44] is one of the rst representation form
for logic functions that was taken by PLA technology [59].
Another two-level Boolean Function synthesis have been proposed as Conjunctive
Normal Form (CNF). A Boolean expression is in CNF if the variables within each
term are ORed together, and the terms are ANDed together. A CNF expression is
satisable if there exists an assignment of variables for which the expression is true.
For example, (a or b) and (not c or d) is true if a and d are true. CNF form is
dened also as product-of-sum (POS) or EX-SOP [68]. POS form is exactly opposite
to the SOP form, meaning that all of the variables are ORed and all of these sum
terms are ANDed. In these two-level logic representation, reducing the number of
"products" in SOP or "sum" in POS result in logic optimization. An exact opti-
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mization tool for these two-level Boolean logic present by ESPRESSO tool. These
Boolean logic syntheses are suitable for simple and small sized functions, thus for the
more complicated function, we can move to DAG logic representation or (multilevel
logic) and BDDs [39].
3.3 Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs)
A binary decision diagram (BDD) is a rooted directed acyclic graph (DAG) [13] as
a multilevel logic synthesis. The directed acyclic graph does not contain cycle, and
every directed edge of the graph (wires) connects nodes, which correspond to logic
functions (gates). In a DAG, a node is a starting node if it has no ingoing edges, and
a node is a terminal node if it has no outgoing edges. Since optimization process
runs on the entire DAG, it cannot be easy without having bounds on their nodes'
functionality. Moreover, memory footprint for each node should be large because
of increase in the representation size. Thus, a more practical and simple construct
of DAGs is considered as binary decision diagrams (BDDs) [39] where all diagrams'
nodes realize the same function.
Graphical representation for function as binary decision diagrams (BDDs) was in-
troduced at rst by Lee [39] in 1959 and it was rened and studied more in other
articles [15, 1, 18]. It can also be used to present circuits. A binary decision diagram
(BDD) is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) [13] with the following properties:
 All the nodes can be terminal or non-terminal.
 All the terminal nodes are labeled with 0 or 1 and have no outgoing edges.
 All the non-terminal nodes are labeled with a Boolean variable.
 All the non-terminal nodes have two outgoing edges labeled with a 0 and a 1
(one drawn with a dashed line and one drawn with a solid line.)
We can simplify these steps to the following BDD where the function is f=(AB)CAB,
and (A,B,C ) are all the variables in the function. (see Figure 3.1)
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Figure 3.1: Binary decision diagram (BDD) of the function f=(AB)CAB.
The size of BDD is dened as the number of variables or (non-terminal nodes),
which act as 2:1 multiplexers. It can be used to improve eciency in various areas
of EDA such as verication, testing, optimization, automated reasoning, etc. [44].
Because of increasing price according to BDD size, it can be supported by some op-
timization algorithms [77]. A BDD that has an ordering variables (x 1,x 2, x 3,....x n)
is ordered BDD (OBDD), and BDD with removed shares and redundant nodes is
reduced BDD (RBDD). A BDD with both reduced and ordered version is called a
reduced ordered BDD (ROBDD).
3.3.1 OBDD
An ordered BDD (OBDD) is a BDD that has an ordering variable (x 1,x 2, x 3,....x n).
The BDD has the ordering (x 1,x 2, x 3,....x n) if:
 All the labels of BDD are in (x 1,x 2, x 3,....x n).
 For any x i followed by x j in a path of BDD graph, we have i < j in the variable
ordering.
 The OBDD (with variables (x 1,x 2, x 3,....x n) has n+1 levels: l1, ..., ln, ln+1 such
that:
- ln+1 is the level containing the terminal nodes (0 and 1).
- l i (1<i<n) is the level containing variable x i.
It is to be noted that two OBDDs, which describes the same function but have
dierent orderings, can be signicantly dierent.
3.3.2 ROBDD
Reduced ordered BDD has the following properties:
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 Removal of redundant nodes (Nodes that have outgoing edges pointing to the
same node can be removed).
 ROBDDs have at most two terminal nodes, labeled with 0 and 1.
The ROBDD (reduced ordered BDD) of function f with ordering O is unique. In
other words, if B and B' be two ROBDDs with the same ordering (x 1,x 2, x 3,....x n),
If B and B' represent the same function, then B and B' have the same structure.
3.3.3 CUDD: Tool to Build BDD Function Representation
CUDD1 (Colorado University Decision Diagram) package [67], written by Fabio
Somenzi's research group, is one of the most complete packages with a C/C++ li-
brary for creating binary decision diagrams (BDDs), zero-suppressed BDDs (ZDD)
[47] and algebraic decision diagrams (ADD) [4]. It has a superabundance of BDD
functionality with the aim of providing an ecient and best-maintained BDD pack-
age in terms of memory and computation that is freely available.
For implementing a BDDs package, we need to dene :
 Nodes;
 An item that contains the overal BDD information;
 Basic algorithms;
Node is the basic item of a BDD. In CUDD, a node is represented by the struct
DdNode , which contains all the information necessary to correctly manipulate
BDDs like variables, number of variables, number of nodes, unique tables and etc.
It can also contain Index which can refer to index of variable in which the node
belongs to Ref for the number of references. When we create BDDs, we have to
reference it to compute BDDs.
The DdManager is the central data structure of CUDD that must be created
before calling any CUDD function and it needs to be passed to every CUDD func-
tion.
1http://www.ecs.umass.edu/ece/labs/vlsicad/ece667/links/bdd.html
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As an example, BDD implementation of Half-Adder in CUDD [67] is shown in below:
DdNode* x1 = Cudd-bddIthVar (manager, 0);
DdNode* x2 = Cudd-bddIthVar (manager, 1);
DdNode* and1;
and1 = Cudd-bddAnd (manager, x1, Cudd-Not(x2));
Cudd-Ref (and1);
DdNode* and2;
and2 = Cudd-bddAnd (manager, Cudd-Not(x1), x2);
Cudd-Ref (and2);
DdNode* sum;
sum = Cudd-bddOr (manager, and1, and2);
Cudd-Ref (sum);
Cudd-RecursiveDeref (manager, and1);
Cudd-RecursiveDeref (manager, and2);
3.4 Multiple-Valued Logic (MV)
In the eld of circuit design, Multiple Valued Logic (MVL) [10, 11, 20, 46, 57, 70, 75]
is a direct generalization of the standard Boolean logic, where the classical Boolean
domain B = f0,1g is replaced by P = f0,1,...,jP j-1g with jP j>1.
Multiple valued networks are in general more compact in area than the correspond-
ing Boolean circuits [12, 36].
Let Pi be the nite subset of natural numbers Pi = f0,1,...,jPi j-1g with jPi j>1. A
multiple valued logic is a generalization of the classical Boolean logic, as described
below:
Denition 1: A multi-valued variable xi is a variables that takes on values from Pi.
Denition 2: A multi-valued function f is a function such that:
F :fP1, P2,... Png ! Pf.
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In particular, when P1 = P2 = .... = Pn = Pf = P we have that:
F : Pn ! P.
Note that, in this case, there are P P
n
possible dierent MVL functions.
A MVL circuit is a circuit composed by MVL gates. MVL gates are a direct gener-
alization of standard Boolean gates. Of course, the number of two-input gates grows
exponentially with the dimension of P. Therefore, while the number of two-input
Boolean gates is 16, the number of two-input MVL gates g : P2! P is P P
2
(e.g.,
19,683 for P = 3).
The objective of multiple-valued logic optimization is to reduce the size of the alge-
braic expression (e.g., a SOP form) representing a MVL function. As in the Boolean
domain, this algebraic expression optimization directly implies the minimization of
the corresponding MVL circuit. Minimization techniques have been studied since
the late nineteen-sixties, and a large variety of two-level (e.g., Espresso-MV [59])
and multi-level (e.g., MVSIS [30]) optimization tools have been proposed.
The main advantages of multiple-valued logic are reduction of wiring complexity
and reduction of the number of interconnections required to implement logic func-
tions [75]. The power dissipation also depends on interconnection complexity; thus,
low power dissipation can be reached using MVL [24]. Designing of dierent combi-
national circuits is another gaining of using multiple-valued logic [19]. However, in
circuit design, the good potential advantages of MVL are mitigated by the diculty
of MVL circuit realization. Fortunately, in our context we do not exploit a hardware
MVL circuit, but only its algebraic description. Therefore, we can completely by-
pass the technology issues that are the typical practical problem in the CAD context.
Moreover, for high level design it is natural to think of multiple valued variables,
rather than Boolean ones. During the design process, the problem described with
multiple valued variables are then transformed in a Boolean problem. This phase,
called encoding, is particularly critical and potentially onerous. The encoding is a
hard problem, especially for large circuits since it is dicult to correlate an encoding
decision with the nal logic optimization of the circuit [12]. Therefore, generally,
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Name Operation Denition
Min x AND y if x<y equal to x, otherwise equal to y
Max x OR y if x>y equal to x, otherwise equal to y
Mod-sum x XOR y (x+y) mod p
Mod-dierence x 	 y (x-y) mod p
Truncated sum x + y min(p  1, sum(x, y))
Table 3.1: Two-place MVL operators.
encoding is done at the beginning without any specic criterion, and then Boolean
logic synthesis is applied to an arbitrary encoded circuit [12]. This is an evident
disadvantage for the optimization of the nal circuit, due to the Boolean nature of
the standard circuits. Clearly, the realization of a MVL circuit would directly solve
the problem.
Binary MVL functions are known as two-place functions [46]. MVL two-place oper-
ators, "min", "max", "mod-sum", "runcated sum" and "mod-dierence", are shown
and dened in Table 3.1. In particular, the standard Boolean AND gate is the min-
imum gate (i.e., x.y = min(x,y)), OR gate can be generalized to the maximum (i.e.,
x + y = max(x,y)) or to the truncated sum gate (i.e., x+ty=min(jP j-1, sum(x, y))),
the XOR gate can be generalized to the mod-sum (i.e., x y = (x+y) mod jP j) or
to the mod dierence (i.e., x 	 y = (x-y) mod jP j).
Two-place (Binary MVL) functions of "min" operator, "max" operator, "mod-sum"
operator, "Mod-dierence" operator and "Truncated sum" operator for P=2,3,4 (P
is Boolean Domain) are illustrated In Figure 3.2. They can be extended also for
P=5,6,.. values. We have 16 elements for P=4 and 32 for P=5. Thus, we have 2P
elements for p-values in Binary MVL functions.
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Figure 3.2: Truth tables for two-input Boolean and MVL operators.
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Chapter 4
Secure Multi-Party Computation
Exploiting Quantum Gates
Recall that our approach aims to reduce the number of non-XOR gates, which di-
rectly result in reducing the number of interactions between the parties and OT at
runtime, reducing then the computation and communication costs. In this chapter,
we consider the design of circuits using quantum gates [73, 53, 27] instead of tradi-
tional ones. The goal is to design a quantum garbled circuit (Q-GC) equivalent to
the original Boolean circuit and computing the same function, so that it is possible
to increase the number of XOR gates, and reduce at the same time the communica-
tion and computation overhead required by the evaluation of non-XOR gates, thus
requiring less number of interactions.
For this reason, in this chapter we consider standard garbling of circuits in sec-
tion §4.1 and quantum implementation of the garbled circuit (GC) in section §4.2.
Then, we compare our results in the number of non-XOR gates in section §4.3.We
show the design Q-GCs for the Millionaires' Problem , which is the problem of
determining which party has the greatest input, and for the 32-bit adder , that
is the computation of the sum of the private inputs. In both cases, we compare
the resulting circuits with the original Boolean circuits used in GC and show the
improvements achieved in terms of reduced communication time.
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4.1 Standard Garbling of Circuits
In this section, we consider two simple examples, one for the design of the GC
computing the comparison function used in the solution of the Millionaires' Problem
(see §4.1.1), and the other for the GC implementing a 32-bit adder (see §4.1.2). In
the rst case, we refer to the solution provided by Fairplay, while in the second case
we start from the circuit returned by the CBFS-MPC framework.
4.1.1 Garbling the Comparison (Millionaires) Circuits
We report here the SFDL programs used to dene 4-bit input for the Millionaires'
problem and the corresponding results obtained in SHDL outputs (see §4.1.1.1). For
the sake of brevity, we report also the results obtained in the 8-bit case (see §4.1.1.2).
4.1.1.1: Garbling the Comparison 4-bit (Millionaires) Circuits
We present the comparison of two 4-bit integers between AliceInput and BobInput.
The SFDL programming of 4-bit Millionaires is shown in below.
program Millionaires f
typeint = Int 4; // 4-bit integer
typeAliceInput = int;
typeBobInput = int;
typeAliceOutput = Boolean;
typeBobOutput = Boolean;
type Output = struct fAliceOutputalice, BobOutput bobg;
type Input = struct fAliceInputalice, BobInput bobg;
function Output output(Input input) f
output.alice = (input.alice>input.bob);
output.bob = (input.bob>input.alice);g
g
And get the following SHDL results as outputs:
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0 input //output$input.bob$0
1 input //output$input.bob$1
2 input //output$input.bob$2
3 input //output$input.bob$3
4 input //output$input.alice$0
5 input //output$input.alice$1
6 input //output$input.alice$2
7 input //output$input.alice$3
8 gate arity 2 table [1 0 0 0] inputs [4 5]
9 gate arity 2 table [0 1 1 0] inputs [4 5]
10 gate arity 2 table [0 1 0 0] inputs [8 6]
11 gate arity 2 table [1 0 0 1] inputs [8 6]
12 gate arity 2 table [1 0 0 1] inputs [10 7]
13 gate arity 2 table [0 0 0 1] inputs [4 0]
14 gate arity 3 table [0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1] inputs [13 9 1]
15 gate arity 3 table [0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1] inputs [14 11 2]
16 gate arity 2 table [0 1 1 0] inputs [12 3]
17 gate arity 2 table [0 1 1 0] inputs [15 16]
18 output gate arity 1 table [0 1] inputs [17] //output$output.alice$0
19 gate arity 2 table [1 0 0 0] inputs [0 1]
20 gate arity 2 table [0 1 1 0] inputs [0 1]
21 gate arity 2 table [0 1 0 0] inputs [19 2]
22 gate arity 2 table [1 0 0 1] inputs [19 2]
23 gate arity 2 table [1 0 0 1] inputs [21 3]
24 gate arity 2 table [0 0 0 1] inputs [0 4]
25 gate arity 3 table [0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1] inputs [24 20 5]
26 gate arity 3 table [0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1] inputs [25 22 6]
27 gate arity 2 table [0 1 1 0] inputs [23 7]
28 gate arity 2 table [0 1 1 0] inputs [26 27]
29 output gate arity 1 table [0 1] inputs [28]
From these results we can conclude that the number of non-XOR gates is equal to
10 (shown in bold in the previous list).
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Figure 4.1: Classical adder.
4.1.1.2: Garbling the Comparison 8-bit (Millionaires) Circuits
In case of 8-bit input, the SFDL program is similar (except in the number of bits)
but as output circuit we get a SHDL list containing 26 non-XOR gates.
4.1.2 Garbling the adder circuits
Let us consider the case of the classic full adder, whose Boolean function is:
S = A [B  CIN ]
where S is the sum, A and B are the summands and CIN is the incoming carry.
The adder is used as a basic block in many other problems. Here we assume that
Alice randomizes the adder's inputs and encrypts the truth-table (as explained in
the introduction) and the two parties wish to execute the addition over their private
values A (held by Alice) and B (held by Bob) to obtain the public result A+B
without disclosing their inputs to each other. Figure 4.1 shows the classical adder
circuit. Applying the CBFS-MPC library (§1.4.2), the GC for a 32-bit adder 1
contains 127 AND gates, 61 XOR gates, and 187 INV gates and the GC for a
64-bit adder 2 contains 265 AND gates, 115 XOR gates, and 379 INV gates.
4.2 Quantum Implementation of Garbled Circuit
(GC)
In this section, we show the quantum version of GC with the aim of reducing non-
XOR gates, which directly results in reduced OT and computation and communi-
1https://www.cs.bris.ac.uk/Research/CryptographySecurity/MPC/adder 32bit.txt
2https://www.cs.bris.ac.uk/Research/CryptographySecurity/MPC/adder 64bit.txt
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cation costs. In the section at rst we dene metrics to measure the eciency of
our models and our idea for generating quantum-garbled circuit, then in §4.2.1 we
consider on the quantum garbled Boolean circuit (Q-GBC) for Millionaires' Problem
in §4.2.2 and Q-GBC for 32-bit adder in §4.2.3.
4.2.1 The Quantum Metrics
We use the following metrics to measure the eciency of our models and our idea
for generating quantum-garbled circuit. The metric implies a partition on the set of
gates:
 Quantum XOR gates (e.g., NOT and CNOT)
 Quantum non-XOR gates (e.g., CCNOT)
In particular, while quantum XOR gates are gates that contain only XORs, quan-
tum non-XOR gates are the gates that contain at least one non-XOR.
As mentioned before, a quantum CNOT gate consists of just 1 quantum XOR gate,
and the quantum Tooli or (CCNOT) gate contains just 1 non-XOR (AND). We
also consider NOT gate as a XOR gate, since NOT A is equivalent to A XOR 1.
In the proposed metric, the cost of a quantum non-XOR gates is the number of
non-XORs that it contains. In particular, the CCNOT gate has a cost of 1. Any
quantum XOR gate has no cost in the metric.
4.2.2 Q-GBC for the Millionaires' Problem
In the Millionaires' problem, previously described (§ 1.1.4), two millionaires want to
securely compare their private input values (money) without revealing more infor-
mation than output result to the other party. This function is indeed a comparison
function [A>B].
The comparison circuit is a synthetic circuit that compares two n-bit numbers and
determines larger than
'
equal to
'
or less than the other. Note that comparator [A>B]
can ba based on subtraction algorithm [51, 61]. Subtractor performs subtraction of
minuend A, subtrahend B, and borrow bit that generates dierence bit and carry
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out in output. The carry and dierence obtained is compared with to get data is
greater or smaller. Thus, the comparison circuit for two N-bit value is a chain of
N-bit subtractors.
4.2.2.1: 4-bit quantum comparator circuit
We use the quantum comparator circuit proposed in [61]. As shown in Figure 4.2,
the comparator is designed exploiting quantum TR gate [72], where a pair of TR
gates is needed for constructing a full subtractor.
A subtractor computes the dierence bits and carry-out bits. Q0-Q3 indicate dif-
ferent bits and R0-R3 indicate the carry-out bits. If Cout (carry) is \1", then A <
B. If Cout does not occur and the dierence is zero, then A = B. If Cout does not
occur, but the dierence is not zero then A > B.
Quantum implementation of TR gate in RevKit is shown in below:
revkit> expr (a!b)
revkit> convert  expr to spec
revkit> exs
runtime: 0.04 secs
revkit > ps -c
Lines: 3
Gates: 2
Logic qubits: 4
revkit > print -c
Then we get these results for each TR gate as shown in Figure 4.3.
According to RevKit result, we can say that every TR gate has 1 CNOT (XOR) gate
and 1 Tooli (non-XOR) gate. Thus, we can conclude that for the implementation
of a 4-bit comparison circuit, we need 8 non-XOR gates.
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Figure 4.2: Quantum comparator [61].
Figure 4.3: Quantum implementation of TR gate using RevKit.
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Figure 4.4: Quantum Peres Full Adder gate (for 1-bit adder).
4.2.2.2: 8-bit quantum comparator circuit
To implement 8-bit quantum comparator circuit, we can use the same circuit de-
scribed in section §4.2.2.1 (Figure 4.2) and extend it to a 8-bit comparator circuit.
Therefore, the 8-bit Millionaires' problem solved with quantum gates has 16 TR
gates and 16 non-XOR gates.
4.2.3 Q-GBC for the 32-bit adder
We use Peres Full Adder gate (PFAG) as a quantum full adder [35] shown in Figure
4.4 The PFAG can be implemented by two quantum Peres gate (PG) [53] as shown
in Figure 4.5. Also, the quantum Implementation of PG in RevKit is shown in below
and Figure 4.6:
revkit> expr [(ab)c]
revkit> convert  expr to spec
revkit> exs
run-time: 0.04 secs
revkit> ps -c
Lines: 4
Gates: 2
T-depth: 3
T-count: 7
Logic qubits: 4
revkit> print -c
Then, according to RevKit result, we can say that every PG has 1 CNOT (XOR)
gate and 1 Tooli (non-XOR) gate. Moreover, a 32-bit adder is a chain of 32 PFAG,
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Figure 4.5: Implementation of PFAG using Peres gates (for 1-bit adder).
Figure 4.6: Quantum Implementation of PR gate using RevKit (for 1-bit adder).
Figure 4.7: Quantum adder 32-bit.
as shown in Figure 4.7. Thus, we can conclude a 32-bit adder can be implemented
as a GC with quantum gates requiring just 64 non-XOR gates.
4.2.4 Q-GBC for the 64-bit adder
To implement quantum garbled circuit implementation of 64-bit adder circuit, we
can use the same circuit described in section §4.2.3 and extend it to a 64-bit adder
circuit as shown in Figure 4.8.
As it is possible to observe in Figure 4.5, every PFAG consists of two Peres gates
(PG) and every PG has 1 CNOT (XOR) gate and 1 Tooli (non-XOR) gate. Thus;
PFAG has 2 non-XOR gates and chain of 64 PFAG concludes 128 non-XOR gates
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Figure 4.8: Quantum adder 64-bit.
Version Milionaire 4-bit Milionaire 8-bit Adder 32-bit Adder 64-bit
GC 10 26 127 265
Quantum GC 8 16 64 128
Table 4.1: Comparison of our circuit in case of number of non-XOR gates.
in 64-bit adder.
4.3 Discussion and Comparison of Results
We have put forward the idea of decreasing the computational cost of SMC by reduc-
ing the number of non-XOR gates using quantum gates. Our approach is innovative
since it is one of the rst attempts of using quantum gates for the design of GCs.
We validate the approach showing its applicability in two classical SMC examples,
the Millionaires' problem, 32bit adder and 64bit adder.
As it is possible to observe in Table 4.1, where we have compared the proposed
quantum GC design with classical GC in terms of the proposed metric (i.e., the
number of non-XOR gates), we have a reduced number of non-XOR gates in all
the examined cases. The results are encouraging, since we report a reduction of
the number of non-XOR gates of about 20% in 4-bit Millionaires' problem, about
36% in 8-bit Millionaires' problem, about 49% in 32-bit adder and about 51.6%
in 64-bit adder. This result can be intuitively explained by the fact that XORs are
very common in quantum circuits.
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Chapter 5
BDDs for Secure Multi-Party
Computation
The aim of this chapter is to dene BDD-based function representation method to
nd classical representations can be equal to XOR function and can be transformed
to XORs gates without altering the nal output. The idea is to identify gates
that are very similar to XOR gates to reduce the number of non-XOR gates in the
circuit, which can result in a reduced number of interactions between the parties,
and therefore in a more ecient secure computation.
5.1 Using BDDs for Multi-Party Computation
When we have a complex circuit, we want to try to transform some of the contained
gates to XOR gates. Now the rst question is that:
"Can we transform some non-XOR gates
of the circuit in XOR gates?"
To answer of this question, we try to nd the similarity of other gates and XOR
gates. This means that we are looking for gates that dier with a XOR gate only
for one output. If the corresponding input never occurs to this gates, it means that
the gate can operates as XOR gate. For example, the similarity of some functions
with XOR is shown below:
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A B A XOR B A OR B
0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 "0" "1"
Table 5.1: Showing similarity of functions f=A+B and f=AB using their truth
tables.
A B AB A.B (AB)+(A.B) (AB)(A.B)
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 1
Table 5.2: Showing similarity of function f=(AB)+(A.B) with f=(AB)(A.B).
Example: Similarity of f=A+B and f=AB
As shown in Table 5.1, gate "OR" can be transformed to "XOR" gate if the inputs
A="1" and B="1" never occur. In this case the "OR" gate can be transformed in
a "XOR" gate.
Example: Similarity of f=(AB)+(A.B) with f=(AB)(A.B)
For example, consider the simple function f=(AB)+(A.B). Note that, the inputs to
the "OR" gate (+) never have the conguration "1""1" (i.e., "(AB)" and "(A.B)"
can not be "1" at the same time. (As shown in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1)). For this
reason, the function f=(AB)+(A.B) can be transformed to the f=(AB)(A.B).
Let us now consider any circuit and try to nd other classical representation that
equal to XOR. It is important to note that we do not want to change the circuit, we
just want to nd gates that are not XORs but work like XORs, and therefore they
can be used as XOR gates.
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Figure 5.1: Dierent results with input (1,1) to both sides of OR gate.
A B A XOR B A Nand B A AND B' A' AND B A OR B
0 0 0 \1" 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 \0" 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 \0" 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 \1"
Table 5.3: Truth table of similar functions to XOR gate.
Finding other classical gates of the circuit similar to XOR gate is possible when
the input conguration on which they dier from a XOR never occurs. Thus, we
can say that these gates can work as XOR gate and can be transformed to XOR
function. Some of the classical functions that dier from the XOR function in just
one case are shown in Table 5.3.
The second question is that:
"How can we check if a input conguration never occurs in
a gate of a given circuit?"
For this reason, we used BDDs method to nd possible classical representation that
can be transformed to XOR, which is discussed in next section.
The main idea is based on the BDD representation of the subfunctions correspond-
ing to the inputs of the gate we want to transform in a XOR. For example consider
in f=f1+f2. If the inputs f1="1" and f2="1" do not occur, the "OR" gate can be
transformed to the "XOR" gate. To perform this check, we need to compute the
intersection between f1 and f2. If the intersection is empty, this means that the input
"1" "1" never occurs.
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In general, if we have one of the gate, (gate in Table 5.3 similar to the XOR gate),
we can check A Nand B performs the intersection of A' AND B' (the input is
"A=0""B=0"). A AND B' performs the intersections between A' AND B (the
input is "A=0""B=1") and so on. In order to perform these intersections we can
use BDDs representing the subfunctions.
5.1.1 Using BDDs to Find Similar Classical Representation
to XOR
Finding the rule to understand whether the dierent input items in each gate hap-
pened or not is very simple if we use array of BDD. Considering BDD of each
item helps us to nd a solution. We can say that this dierent item would never
happen if its BDD were equal to "0" (Zero). We clarify this method using the
BDDs for 32-bit adder as discussed below.
5.1.1.1: BDDs for 32-bit Adder:
We have presented all the subfunctions of 32-bit adder1 according to CBFS-MPC
tool (see §4.1.2 ) using several BDDs as shown in Figure 5.2.
As we have seen before, the number of inputs' wires are 32 and the number of
gates is 439. The rst 64 elements in our BDDs array consist of our inputs, which
for each element we have BDD (see Figure 5.2). From 64 to 438 we have BDDs of
gates and the last 33 BDD (from 406 to 438) we have BDDs of outputs.
Now, the main question is:
"How can we nd the gate that can be replaced with a XOR gate? and how can we
nd whether their particular case can happen or not?"
The answer to this question can be found on the BDDs. The gate can work as XOR
gate and can be replaced with XOR gate if its BDD was equal to "0", which means
this particular case did not happen at all. In this particular case, we have just AND,
NOT and XOR gates. We try to transform these AND, NOT gates to XOR gate.
1https://www.cs.bris.ac.uk/Research/CryptographySecurity/MPC/adder 32bit.txt
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Figure 5.2: Array of BDDs for 32-bit adder.
For example, let us consider this case:
2 1 94 95 92 AND nAnd gate with 2 inputs, 1 outputs , inputs:(94 , 95) , output:92
1 1 92 89 INV nNOT gate with 1 input, 1 output , input:92 , output:89
That means: 89 = ! (94 AND 95)
Let us try to see if (94 AND 95) happened or not. We should see its BDD, if it is
equal to "0", we can conclude that this case can be worked as XOR gate and can
be replaced with XOR gate.
Implementation of our method:
We used CUDD for making array of BDDs and examined our method for 32-bit
adder and 64-bit adder2 functions, Data Encryption Standard (DES)3 and MD54
which can be performed also for other functions. Some important notes of this cod-
ing (in case of 32-bit adder), which can be similar for other functions are explained
2https://www.cs.bris.ac.uk/Research/CryptographySecurity/MPC/adder 64bit.txt
3https://www.cs.bris.ac.uk/Research/CryptographySecurity/MPC/DES-expanded.txt
4https://www.cs.bris.ac.uk/Research/CryptographySecurity/MPC/md5.txt
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below:
 At rst, we have to dene number of inputs (variables) equal to "64" (x0-x63),
number of outputs equal to "33" and number of gates equal to "439". We
constructed BDDs for these variables and gates as shown in Figure 5.2. We
should also dene name of inputs as a string to perform XOR, AND or INV
and number of input(s) in gates that can be "1" for INV and "2" for AND
or XOR (as you seen before, in 32-bit adder function, we have just 3 types of
gates; AND, INV and XOR).
 We can allocate the place for gates in this array in which each element is BDDs
node; meaning that we have BDDs for each node that should be allocated.
 When we create BDDs for each node, we have to reference it to compute BDDs
and conrm that BDDs is done.
Note: When we reading the circuit, we just count the number of times that
it is appear. What we have to do is that everytime a gate is used by another
gate, we increment the reference of this gate. So, we can nd how many times
this gate is used.
 We try to replace AND gate with XOR gate, because the cost of INV is "0" and
it is not necessary to change it to XOR gate.
 The important note is that, when we found that AND gate can be transformed
to XOR gate, it is necessary to check whether it is used somewhere else or
not. We can not perform this transform if it is used for more than one time
in the network. So, we have to be sure that nobody else used this gate. For
this reason, we should use another array to count how many times this gate
is used. This is a vector that called "references". If reference is equal to "0"
means that this gate can be removed; otherwise, it means that this gate is
used some where else. Then, references array help us to check whether we
have gained or not.
 We should also keep the order of lines (e.g., 32-bit adder5 or 64-bit adder6). So,
in process of making AND gate transform to XOR gate, we would like just a
5https://www.cs.bris.ac.uk/Research/CryptographySecurity/MPC/adder 32bit.txt
6https://www.cs.bris.ac.uk/Research/CryptographySecurity/MPC/adder 64bit.txt
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Methods
32-bit Adder
#NCycle #ANDs #XORs #INVs #Gain
CBFS-MPC - 127 61 187 -
CUDD (BDDs) 300 125 63 187 2
Table 5.4: Comparison of our gaining for 32-bit Adder in BDDs method.
Methods
64-bit Adder
#NCycle #ANDs #XORs #INVs #Gain
CBFS-MPC - 265 115 379 -
CUDD (BDDs) 500 253 127 379 12
Table 5.5: Comparison of our gaining for 64-bit Adder in BDDs method.
make copy exactly the same and doing changes; nothing else.
 BDDs of these functions was too big, because of this we used BDD Init to say
"stop" and get a gain. (e.g., "stop" sfter position 300 for 32-bit adder and 500
for 64-bit adder )
5.1.2 BDDs Method for Adders
We have applied and compared the proposed BDDs method with previous imple-
mentation of garbled Boolean circuit using CBFS-MPC (§4.1.2) for 32-bit adder
(Table 5.4) and 64-bit adder (Table 5.4) and get following results in the number of
non-XOR gates.
5.1.3 BDDs Method for Data Encryption Standard (DES)
Data Encryption Standard (DES) [74] is a symmetric-key method of data encryption
that was published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in
the early 1970. It was the rst encryption algorithm adapted by the U.S.government
for public exposure and also by industries such as nancial services, where strong
encryption are highly needed. The simplicity of DES was considered for using it
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in wide variety of embedded systems, smart cards, SIM cards and network devices
requiring encryption like modems and routers.
Data Encryption Standard (DES) works by using the same key to encrypt and
decrypt a message, so both the sender and the receiver should know and use the
same private key. cryptographic key and algorithm are applied to a block of data
which the block size in DES algorithm is 64 bits. DES takes a xed-length block
of the message (plaintext) and transforms it through a series of permutation and
substitution into another bit-string (ciphertext) with same length. Encryption of a
block of the message also takes place in 16 rounds.
DES uses a 64-bit key to customize the transformation; however, only 56 of these
are actually used by the algorithm, but eight of those bits are used for parity checks.
Decryption can performed by those who know the particular key used to encrypt.
Using BDDs method for DES algorithm both with key expanded and no key expan-
sion in dierent time-cycles results very good improving in the number of non-XOR
gates as shown in Table 5.6 and Table 5.7.
5.1.4 BDDs Method for MD5 Cryptographic Function
The MD5 algorithm is a one-way cryptographic function that accepts a message of
any length as input and returns a xed-length 128-bit digest value as output. The
message digest output is sometimes also called the "hash" or "ngerprint" of the
input.
MD5 was designed by well-known cryptographer Ronald Rivest in 1991 used in
many situations where a potentially long message needs to be processed. The most
common application of MD5 is the creation and verication of digital signatures.
As it is possible to observe in Table 5.8, using BDDs method for MD5 function
can get very good results in the number of non-XOR gates in dierent time-cycles.
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Methods
DES (Key Expanded)
#NCycle #ANDs #XORs #INVs #Gain
CBFS-MPC - 18175 1351 10875 -
CUDD (BDDs) 500 18170 1356 10875 5
CUDD (BDDs) 600 18148 1378 10875 27
CUDD (BDDs) 650 18125 1401 10875 50
CUDD (BDDs) 800 18048 1478 10875 127
CUDD (BDDs) 900 18021 1505 10875 154
CUDD (BDDs) 1000 17980 1546 10875 195
CUDD (BDDs) 1500 17861 1665 10875 314
CUDD (BDDs) 1700 17790 1736 10875 385
CUDD (BDDs) 1800 17751 1775 10875 424
CUDD (BDDs) 1900 17734 1792 10875 441
Table 5.6: Comparison of our gaining for DES (Key Expanded) in BDDs method.
Methods
DES (No Key Expansion)
#NCycle #ANDs #XORs #INVs #Gain
CBFS-MPC - 18124 1340 10849 -
CUDD (BDDs) 500 18122 1342 10849 2
CUDD (BDDs) 600 18108 1356 10849 16
CUDD (BDDs) 650 18086 1378 10849 50
CUDD (BDDs) 1000 17910 1554 10849 214
CUDD (BDDs) 900 18021 1505 10875 154
CUDD (BDDs) 1500 17799 1665 10849 325
CUDD (BDDs) 1600 17752 1712 10849 372
CUDD (BDDs) 1700 177170 1747 10849 407
CUDD (BDDs) 1800 17689 1775 10849 435
CUDD (BDDs) 1900 17680 1784 10849 444
Table 5.7: Comparison of our gaining for DES (No Key Expanded) in BDDs method.
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Methods
MD5
#NCycle #ANDs #XORs #INVs #Gain
CBFS-MPC - 29084 14150 34627 -
CUDD (BDDs) 700 29083 14151 34627 1
CUDD (BDDs) 800 29079 14155 34627 5
CUDD (BDDs) 850 29078 14156 34627 6
CUDD (BDDs) 900 29077 14157 34627 7
CUDD (BDDs) 1000 29075 14159 34627 9
CUDD (BDDs) 1100 29072 14162 34627 12
CUDD (BDDs) 1200 29068 14166 34627 16
CUDD (BDDs) 1300 29067 14167 34627 17
Table 5.8: Comparison of our gaining for MD5 in BDDs method.
5.1.5 Discussion and Comparison of Experimental Results
We have compared the proposed BDDs method with previous implementation of
garbled Boolean circuit using CBFS-MPC (§4.1.2). We can conclude that we have a
reduced number of non-XOR gates (AND gates) in 32-bit adder of about 1.6%, in
64-bit adder of about 4.6%, in MD5 of about 0.05% and in DES of about 2.5%.
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Chapter 6
Multiple -Valued Logic for Secure
Multi-Party Computation
As mentioned before, Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) protocols enable two
or more parties to compute collaboratively generic functions while keeping secret
their inputs, sharing only the nal result. To achieve this goal, a technique relying
on the design of Garbled Circuits (GC) has been rstly proposed by Yao. Garbled
circuits are Boolean circuits that can be evaluated using a distributed protocol for
computing the result for each gate, till computing the output values. According
to this method, standard function f is encoded in a Boolean function fB that can
be represented by a Boolean circuit. Starting from their input values, the parties
interact to compute the nal result by exchanging some encrypted information in
order to evaluate the output of each Boolean gate in the circuit. For this reason,
the cost of the secure two-party computation protocol is generally proportional to
the number of logic gates in the Boolean circuit. To avoid (or limit) the encoding
of the function to be securely computed, and in order to obtain a more compact
circuit description, in this section we study the generalization of the classical Yao's
protocol in the MVL context. We show also how in this context it is possible to
extend some of the techniques to improve the evaluation of multiple valued gates,
having no communication costs.
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6.1 Multiple Valued Yao's Protocol
We will explore alternative GC representations, focusing on Multiple Valued Logic
ones and analyze the deployment of Multiple Valued Logic techniques for the design
of GC. Yao's Garbled Circuit construction is composed of two phases: Garbling and
Evaluation, which are distinctly executed by the two parties. During the Garbling
phase, Alice converts a circuit into a garbled circuit, while Bob performs the Eval-
uation phase taking in input the garbled circuit, executing some interactions with
Alice, and nally computing the output value.
Here we consider two parties, Alice and Bob that want to evaluate the Multiple-
Valued Logic (MVL) (§3.4) instead of the Boolean logic gate, which result in reduced
wiring complexity and number of interactions required to implement logic functions
of Garbled Circuits.
In order to generalize Yao's construction, let us consider a circuit composed of a
single multiple valued gate with two input wires, w1 and w2, and one output wire
w1. Let x1 denote the input multiple-valued value known only to Alice, and x2 the
input multiple-valued value known only to Bob.
Consider the set P = f0; 1; : : : ; p 1g with p = jP j > 1 and the multiple-valued gate
G : P 2 ! P . To proceed with the computation, for each wire wi Alice generates
p randomly selected dierent cryptographic keys, one for the input value 0 denoted
by k0i , one for the input value 1, k
1
i , : : :, one for the input value p  1, k
p 1
i .
The keys are used as input to a selected encryption algorithm, denoted as Ek1;k2;:::;kp 1(m).
Using those keys, Alice can compute the garbled truth table for the function com-
puted by the gate, where each entry is obtained using a combination of the input keys
corresponding to the possible input values, and contains the encryption of the cor-
responding output value of the gate. Note that a truth table for a gate G : P 2 ! P
has jP j2 entries. For example, while a truth table in the Boolean domain has 4
Boolean entries, in the case of jP j = 3 the truth table has 9 multiple valued values.
XOR Multiple-Valued Logic (MVL) (i.e., p=3) according to ("mod-sum" operator)
for two parties with two input wires x1 and x2, is shown in in Table 6.1.
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x y z (MV XOR)
0 0 0
0 1 1
0 2 2
1 0 1
1 1 2
1 2 0
2 0 2
2 1 0
2 2 1
Table 6.1: Truth table of MV XOR (mod-sum) operation for p=3 in Garble Circuit.
To generate the garbled Boolean circuit Alice selects and associates random keys
to each input and output wire and for each possible value. In our MV XOR gate,
she generates the random keys k0x, k
1
x, k
2
x for input wire x and k
0
y, k
1
y, k
2
y for
input wire y and k0z, k
1
z, k
2
z for output wire z as shown in Figure 6.1. Alice en-
crypts the truth table of the gate using those random keys and sends the garbled
truth table to Bob. The resulting garbled truth table is shown in Table 6.2. Once
Alice has computed the garbled values for all the entries of the table, she can send
a permutation of the truth table, together with the keys corresponding to her inputs.
Notice that the knowledge of the keys, doesn't allow Bob to learn anything on
the input values. At this point, Bob needs, from Alice, the keys corresponding to
her own input values without disclosing them to Alice. For this purpose, the party
can engage in an Oblivious Transfer protocol (OT), allowing Bob to learn the keys
corresponding to his inputs.
In general, the GC construction relies on 1   out   of   2 OT protocol between
a sender and a reciever. The sender Alice has two secret values v0 and v1, and the
receiver has a secret bit i. At the end of the protocol Bob learns vi, but nothing
about vi 1, while Alice doesn't learn anything about the selection bit i. OT protocol
is a widely studied cryptographic primitive, with dierent variants and implementa-
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Figure 6.1: MV XOR gate (mod-sum) with its corresponding wire keys.
x y
0 0 Ek0x(Ek
0
y(k
0
z))
0 1 Ek0x(Ek
1
y(k
1
z))
0 2 Ek0x(Ek
2
y(k
2
z))
1 0 Ek1x(Ek
0
y(k
1
z))
1 1 Ek1x(Ek
1
y(k
2
z))
1 2 Ek1x(Ek
2
y(k
0
z))
2 0 Ek2x(Ek
0
y(k
2
z))
2 1 Ek2x(Ek
1
y(k
0
z))
2 2 Ek2x(Ek
2
y(k
1
z))
Table 6.2: Initial garbled circuit table for MV XOR gate.
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tion, whose robustness has been considered under dierent security models. In the
Yao extension, we consider a 1   out   of   n-OT protocol that can be dened as
a natural generalization of a 1   out   of   2 OT, where the sender has n values,
and the receiver has an index i, corresponding to the value he owns and for which
she wishes to receive the i-th key, without the sender learning i. At the end, the
OT protocol allows Bob to retrieve the right key corresponding to her input value
for the gate, while Alice doesn't learn anything about the selected input. Since now
Bob knows the two keys, he can decrypt the right entry in the table, and retrieve
the key of the output value.
In general, for a circuit composed of multiple gates, Alice should compute garbled
values for all the input wires and use them for computing the truth table for each
multiple-valued gate. Then she should send all the truth tables, and all her input
values to Bob, which can invoke the OT protocol for each needed input value to the
circuit. Once retrieved all the values, Bob can compute the output keys for all the
gates of the circuit.
At the end of the protocol, Bob has generated the key k of the nal output and
sends it to Alice. The party Alice can now send to Bob the value, correspond-
ing to k, of the output of the entire function. This value is the nal result of the
computation.
6.2 Improved Evaluation for Multiple Valued Gates
In [37], Kolesnikov and Schneider presented an optimisation, which allows the eval-
uation of XOR gates for free, avoiding any interaction between the two parties for
such gates, i.e. there is no need to compute and send the garbled tables for the XOR
gates. The optimisation requires that there is a global random value R known only
to one party, such that for all garbled wires wi it holds that k
1
i = k
0
i  R, i.e. the
garbled value corresponding to 1 for a wire, is determined by XOR-ing the garbled
0 value with the random quantity R. In this way, computing the output value for
a XOR gate amounts to compute the value resulting by the XOR of the two input
values. Security of this solution has been proved in dierent context in [37, 55] under
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dierent assumptions.
Here we show how also in the case of multiple valued gates, these improved evalu-
ation techniques can be easily extended. Specically, we show how the SUM gate
G, in the case of three-valued logic can be can be evaluated without communication
between the parties (the reasoning holds for gates in the case of P values).
Let G have two input wires Wa and Wb and output wire Wc. Garble the wire
values as follows. Randomly choose w0a, w
0
b ; R1; R2 2R f0; 1; 2g
N , with the following
properties for R1 and R2:
R1 R2 = 0
,
R1 R1 = R2
,
R2 R2 = R1
. Set w0c = w
0
a  w
0
b , and 8i 2 (a; b; c) : w
1
i = w
0
i R1 and w
2
i = w
0
i R2
It is easy to see that the garbled gate output is simply obtained by summing the
garbled gate inputs:
w0c = w
0
a  w
0
b = (w
0
a R1) (R2  w
0
b ) = w
1
a  w
2
b =
(w0a R2) (R1  w
0
b ) = w
2
a  w
1
b
w1c = w
0
c R1 = w
0
a  (w
0
b R1) = w
0
a  w
1
b = (w
0
a R1)
w0b = w
1
a  w
0
b = (w
0
a R1 R1) (R2  w
0
b ) = w
2
a  w
2
b
w2c = w
0
c R2 = w
0
a  (w
0
b R2) = w
0
a  w
2
b = (w
0
a R2)
w0b = w
2
a  w
0
b = (w
0
a R2 R2) (R1  w
0
b ) = w
1
a  w
1
b
We postpone here the security proofs for this approach.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
Two-party Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) protocols have performed col-
laborative computation of generic function f of their respective inputs x1 and x2,
between two or more parties who do not want to disclose the input values they own
and share only the computed result. In the general formulation, two parties want
to compute a function on their respective inputs, while maintaining the privacy of
the inputs. Secure multi-party computation protocols can have high communication
cost as the complexity of the computation grows. Recently, the question to improve
eciency in secure multi-party computation and its potential has gained much in-
terest. Signicant improvements in eciency have been achieved and a number of
SMC-based solutions to a number of problems such as private auctions, tax-fraud
detection, email ltering and others have been delivered. In this thesis, we discussed
about the idea of decreasing the communication complexity and computational cost
of secure multi-party computation (SMC).
One of the proposed approaches to solve the SMC problem relies on the design
of Garbled Circuit (GC), proposed by Yao (§1.2). The Garbled Circuit (GC) proto-
col has been introduced as a method for addressing two-party secure computations
for the evaluation of the input function (f) represented as a Boolean Circuit, which
is based on the encryption of the input and intermediate values so that only the nal
result is shared among the parties. The use of garbling for secure multi-party shared
computation has seemed to be widely studied in the eld of secure computing and
its application. Since the execution of this protocol requires interaction between
the collaborating parties, the total cost and run-time interaction between parties
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increases linearly with the number of gates, and can be huge for complex GC. So,
reducing the circuit size and the number of gates is important to reduce the overall
communication cost and the number of operations for the evaluation of GC.
Free-XOR technique (§1.3.1), proposed by Kolesnikov and Schneider [37], is one
of the possible ways to improve the performance of garbled circuit (GC). According
to this idea, secure evaluation of XOR gates does not need the transfer of garbled
tables and does not require garbling of XOR gates. So, replacing costly non-XOR
gates with some free-XOR gates allows us to have more ecient secure computation.
In this dissertation, we have explored the idea of decreasing communication com-
plexity and communication cost of SMC and reduced its computation time and the
number of operations based on reducing the number of non-XOR gates to improve
eciency of the Garbled Circuit construction, which means reducing the circuit cost
and the gates for interaction required in the Boolean Circuit. We focus on reduc-
ing the number of interactions between parties at runtime, which results in reduced
communication cost and communication time of Secure Multi-party Computation
(SMC) by reducing the number of non-XOR gates since XOR gates have no cost for
the execution of the secure computation protocol. This thesis is proposing to use
following three approaches (exploiting Quantum gates, BDDs and MVL) to reduce
gate complexity and cost in realization of garbled circuit and improve computational
time and communication cost of SMC and validate these approaches showing its ap-
plicability in classical SMC examples, the Millionaires' problem, adders, DES and
MD5.
In chapter 4, we have discussed the possibility to construct Garbled Circuit using
quantum gates (QG), observing that in some cases, the quantum GC requires a lower
number of non-XOR gates with respect to the corresponding classical GC implemen-
tations. Having fewer non-XOR gates results in a reduced number of interactions
between the parties at runtime, reducing the communication cost and improving the
overall eciency of the execution of the SMC protocol. Our approach is innovative
since it is one of the rst attempts of using quantum gates for the design of GCs.
Our experimental results show that reduction of the number of non-XOR gates was
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about 20% of 4-bit Millionaires' problem, about 36% of 8-bit Millionaires' problem,
about 51.6% of 64-bit adder, and about 49% in the 32-bit adder. This result can
be intuitively explained by the fact that XORs are very common in quantum circuits.
In chapter 5, we used a Binary Decision Diagram structure (BDD) for our im-
proving proposed methods. Using BDDs helps us to nd similarity of other function
representations to XOR operation, aiming at transforming some non-XOR gates of
the circuit in XOR gates to reduce the number of non-XOR gates in GC construc-
tion, which can result in reducing the communication costs and circuit cost. Our
experimental results show that reduction of the number of non-XOR gates was about
1.6% of 32-bit adder, 4.6% of 64-bit adder, 0.05% of MD5 function and 2.5% of DES.
In chapter 6, we generalize Yao's secure two-party computation protocol to multiple-
valued logic and we consider a general multiple-valued function f that is represented
by a multiple-valued circuit composed by multiple-valued gates and discussing their
impact on the overall computation and communication costs. We pursue the idea of
using Multiple Valued Logic for the synthesis of garbled circuits, showing an exten-
sion of the classic Yao protocol for the evaluation of multiple valued gates. In this
chapter, we show how these improved evaluation techniques can be readily extended
to the case of MVL gates.
7.1 Future Work
In the future, we intend to investigate several directions as follows:
 Possible future research on novel logic representations with support of XOR gates,
i.e., the XOR-AND-Inverter Graphs (XAIGs). Using XOR based synthesis and
implementing on XAIG based rewriting algorithm in optimization tool (e.g.,
ABC) to improve eciency of GC.
 Investigate some combinational network and converting Boolean circuit to cell-
based combinational circuit with suitable elementary cells whose properties
can be converted in a quantum version. Thus, we can drive these properties
from elementary cell for the whole garbled circuit (GC).
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 Developing security proofs for our proposed protocols, as well as a full set of ex-
perimental prototypes to compare the size and the performance of the multiple
valued (MV) circuits with respect the original circuits.
 We plan to work on dierent methods and techniques for the minimization of non-
XOR gates, by using tools and design techniques usually deployed in synthesis
for achieving dierent goals.
 Working on dierent methods for the optimization of the synthesis of garbled
circuit relying on quantum gates (QG) and MVL gates, trying to apply the
methodology to more complex case studies.
 Designing quantum GC directly from the denition of the input function, and not
from the denition of a GC.
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